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The "New" Substantive Due Process and the 
Democratic Ethic: A Prolegomenon* 
Robert G. Dixon, Jr. ** 
The intrinsic difficulty of the due process concept, old or 
new, is exceeded only by the difficulty of saying something new 
about it. One can catalog the decisions and try to hypothesize a 
general theory,l or expatiate at  great length on the inconsistent 
but seminal opinions in Griswold v. Conne~ticut ,~ or subject the 
more recent series of contraception3 or abortion4 decisions to mi- 
crocosmic analysis. The grundnorms, however, are not easily 
found. Just as the equality concept "[olnce loosed . . . is not 
easily ~ab ined , "~  the due process concept resists simple descrip- 
tion and definition. 
The purpose of this article is to suggest that the "due 
process-fundamental rights" spirit of judicial review, although 
not grounded on any intent of the framers of the Constitution to 
incorporate natural law, is pervasive and has broader impact in 
judicial review than is commonly realized. 
The attraction of the due process concept is that its vague, 
open-ended, developmental quality qualifies it as a basis for 
* This paper was delivered November 7, 1975 a t  the Centennial Lectures on Constitu- 
tional Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. It  is printed without 
substantial change, except for the addition of footnotes. 
** Daniel Noyes Kirby Professor of Law, Washington University; Former Assistant 
Attorney General In Charge of the Office of Legal Counsel, United States Department of 
Justice 1973-1974. 
1. See, e.g., Goodpaster, The Constitution and Fundamental Rights, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 
479 (1973). Goodpaster classifies due process and equal protection as "fundamental 
rights." Id. a t  511. But the due process and equal protection clauses are vague. Are not 
the real questions these: what particular "fundamental rights" are chosen by the Court 
for protection under these vague clauses, and what are the criteria for choice? 
2. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). See, e.g., Comments on the Griswold Case, 64 MICH. L. REV. 
197 (1965) (a collection of the comments of Professors Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Thomas I. 
Emerson, Paul G. Kauper, Robert B. McKay, and Arthur E. Sutherland); Beaney, The 
Griswold Case and the Expanding Right of Privacy, 1966 WIS. L. REV. 979; Katin, Gris- 
wold v. Connecticut: The Justices and Connecticut's "Uncommonly Silly Law," 42 NOTHE 
DAME LAW. 680 (1967). 
3. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 
(1965); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961). 
4. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973). 
5. Cox, The Supreme Court, 1965 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and 
the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91 (1966). 
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broad judicial discretion in protecting society against the proce- 
dural or substantive excesses of the political branches.VI'he 
courts "find" and apply higher law principles to promote a free, 
fair, and just society. The due process concept allows a court to 
take care of the textually unprovided-for case of unconstitu- 
tionality, to go beyond the "relatively" precise and therefore lim- 
ited nature of the constitutional clauses dealing with free speech, 
freedom of religion, impairment of the obligation of contracts and 
the like. 
The due process concept is far broader than even the elastic 
commerce clause. There is an intrinsic logic or limitation in the 
"affecting commerce" doctrine as a base for national power over 
intrastate activities-even if some parts of Justice Clark's opinion 
in the public accomodations case, Katzenbach u. McClung,' at- 
tenuate the nexus principle almost to the breaking point. Can it 
be denied that the cumulative effect of denying public accommo- 
dations to blacks will adversely "affect" the flexibility of the 
national employment market and even decisions concerning 
plant location and employee transfer? Accordingly, once one per- 
ceives "commerce" as based on the Founding Fathers' concern for 
the creation and maintenance of a "national economy," plausibil- 
ity is restored. Commerce clause cases, however, whether or not 
rightly decided, do not involve supposedly immutable principles 
as do due process cases? 
One attraction of the due process concept to challengers of 
governmental action-whether in the cause of preserving laissez- 
faire in economic mattersg or personal freedom and privacy in 
birth control and ab~rt ion~~-l ies in its vagueness; normally chal- 
lengers can a t  least get a hearing." But this vagueness extends to 
6. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 
(1971); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 
(1942); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 
45 (1905). 
7. 379 U.S. 294 (1964). 
8. Most of what Congress has attempted to do in recent civil rights legislation is 
clearly within the permissible reach of the states' police power. See Levitt & Sons v. 
Division Against Discrimination, 31 N.J. 514, 158 A.2d 177 (1960); Reference, Housing, 8 
RACE REL. L. REP. 769 (1963). The constitutional issue in congressional statute cases like 
Katzenbach centers on the source of the regulation, not its intrinsic justice. 
9. See, e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 
U.S. 1 (1915); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 
578 (1897). 
10. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); 
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
11. Of course, there is still a need to have a t  least a colorable claim of federal right 
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what a court is empowered to do with a claim once it has been 
allowed to enter the courthouse door. The breadth of this judicial 
discretion poses the serious question of the proper role, if any, for 
textually undefined higher law in a democratic society. Also 
raised are problems of proof and of determining what proof is 
relevant? Ultimately we reach the hackneyed, but still meaning- 
ful, phrase "judicial restraint versus judicial acti~ism,"~%nd we 
occasionally question the "wisdom" espoused by a protected and 
protective judiciary that purports both to find the real national 
consensus and to hold us all to the standards of the American 
dream. 
Thus perceived, the due process concept, perhaps more 
starkly so in its "new" dress, forces us to deal again with the 
"higher law" background of American constitutional law and to 
ask the awkward question: Should the judiciary always have the 
last word, limited only by a sense of self-restraint that flows from 
federalism,14 from the political question doctrine,I%r, as Justice 
Jackson put it, simply from a "circumspect sense" of what is fit 
for judicial treatment and what is not?I6 
In the present era, any discussion of the "new" substantive 
due process invites reconsideration of at  least the following: the 
"fundamental right" concept; the role of due process in spawning 
new rights such as the right to travelt7 and to privacy in various 
zones; the irrebutable presumption doctrine as a new basis for 
invalidating legislative prescriptions; the overlap of the "new" 
substantive due process with the "new" equal protection; and the 
adequacy of judicial procedures for eliciting the full range of rele- 
vant facts and values. Certainly this list is not exhaustive; other 
to get across the judicial threshhold. For a discussion of Justice Harlan's point in Baker 
v.  Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), that under any reasonable past construction of Supreme 
Court cases, the Fourteenth Amendment is not applicable to apportionment see R. DIXON, 
DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION-REAPPORTIONMENT I  LAW AND POLITICS 121 (1968) 
[hereinafter cited as DIXON]. 
12. See Miller & Barron, The Supreme Court, the Adversary System, and the Flou) 
of Information to the Justices, A Preliminary Inquiry, 61 VA. L. REV. 1187 (1975). 
13. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 118 (1962). 
14. The "new federalism" concept is evidenced by the Supreme Court's reluctance 
to interfere with the enforcement of state laws in state courts. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 
401 U.S. 37 (1971); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971); Perez v.  Ledesma, 401 U.S. 
82 (1971). Compare Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), with Dombrowski v. Pfister, 
380 U.S. 479 (1965). 
15. See Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 
75 YALE L.J. 517 (1966). See also DIXON, supra note 11, at 99-118. 
16. Public Service Comm'n v. Wyckoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 243 (1952). 
17. See, e.g., Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Kent v. Dulles, 357 
U.S. 116 (1958). 
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questions abound. For example, are the courts fairly close to 
Lochner-typelR intrusions into the legislative sphere in such dis- 
parate areas as reapportionment litigation and "section 1983"19 
challenges to whole systems of state institution administration? 
In approaching a topic as abstruse and limitless as due pro- 
cess, a recourse to historical beginnings and seemingly simple 
first principles can be instructive. Due process review of statutes 
and executive acts puts in the sharpest focus possible the endless 
tango between judicial activism and judicial restraint. At a more 
basic level, it invites reconsideration of the legitimizing theories 
for the American practice of judicial review, particularly the no- 
tion of natural law. This last point is significant inasmuch as 
natural law or natural justice was invoked to justify judicial vigor 
in constitutional litigation or to add meaning to due process as 
early as Calder u. and as recently as Duncan u. L~uis iana.~ '  
Further, the notion of natural law has been relied on to explain 
our constitutional beginnings and to justify judicial review itself. 
A. Lack o f  Support for Judicial Review i n  Contemporaneous 
Natural Law Theory 
I t  is axiomatic tha t  a major element in the justificatory 
theory for the American Revolution was derived from John 
Locke's theory of the social contractz2 and its derivative principle 
of a right to cast off rulers faithless to the terms of the supposed 
agreement. As Professor Edward S. Corwin has pointed out, the. 
written Constitution can be viewed as a tangible embodiment of 
a new agreement.23 In this manner, the social contract concept is 
brought down from the rarified stratosphere of natural law- 
natural rights theorizihg and made concrete. 
18. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
19. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). 
20. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798). In Calder, Justice Chase proclaimed that "[aln Act 
of the Legislature (for I cannot call it law) contrary to the great first principles of the social 
compact, cannot be considered a rightful exercise of legislative authority." Id. a t  388. 
Justice Iredell, concurring, remonstrated that, "the ideas of natural justice are regulated 
by no fixed standard." Id. at  399. 
21. 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
22. Locke, Second Treatise on Civil Government, in SOCIAL CONTRACT: ESSAYS BY 
LOCKE, HUME, AND ROUSSEAU 69 (Oxford U. Press 1948) [hereinafter cited as Second 
Treatise]. 
23. Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law (pts. 1, 
2), 42 HAW. L. REV. 149, 365 (1928) [hereinafter cited as Corwin]. 
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It is less easy, however, to move from the Lockean natural 
law-natural rights foundation for both the Declaration of Inde- 
pendence and the Constitution of 1789 to a justification in similar 
terms for broad-gauged judicial review of governmental action 
under the "people's pact." Lockean natural law is not an elitist 
concept. Indeed, natural law generally, despite its esoteric qual- 
has not been an elitist concept except when intertwined with 
theology and a hierarchical church.25 It was, for example, a tenet 
of Cicero that natural law requires no interpreter other than the 
individual himself.26 
Similarly, Lockean natural law is set forth as a set of self- 
evident propositions prescribing how, to any reasonable man, the 
basic components of the social order must be perceived. The 
state, for example, is to enforce the natural right to private prop- 
erty that arises when man mixes his labor with the free goods of 
nature,27 but Locke does not contemplate an enforcement or re- 
view mechanism divorced from popular control. He does not deal 
with the problem of better or worse social policies, the harmoniza- 
tion of wills, or the achievement of a just and virtuous so- 
ciety-unless it be implicit that a properly structured system will 
yield these fruits au tomat i~a l ly .~~  Although in Locke, as in other 
natural law theorists, there are high-sounding generalizations on 
liberty and equrlity, the primary stress is on the legislative power 
as the supreme power in the commonwealth. To be sure, natural 
law commands that the legislative power design laws only for 
"the good of the people."29 The absence of formal review devices, 
24. "As a matter of fact all theories of natural law have a singular vagueness which 
is both an advantage and disadvantage in the application of the theories." Preface to C. 
HAINES, THE REVIVAL OF NATURAL LAW CONCEPTS a t  uii (1930). 
25. On the "re-secularization of natural law" in the work of Grotius see G. SABINE, A 
HISTORY OF POLITICAL THEORY 420 (rev. ed. 1950) [hereinafter cited as SABINE]. 
26. Corwin, supra note 23, a t  161. 
27. Second Treatise, supra note 22, §§ 27, 138. 
28. Indeed, one writer has suggested that if Locke's social theory contemplates a 
contract between a ruler and the people, it is a static concept. If the right of revolution 
depends on the violation of a contract, the people are never entitled to begin a revolt unless 
the rulers have first broken the contract, even though conditions have changed and the 
people have changed their ideas of what they want from their government. See A.P. 
LAMPRECHT, THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE 148 (1962). This obser- 
vation is warranted, however, only if the basic popular sovereignty thrust in Locke and 
the necessary flexibility on policy which flows from an election system are ignored. For 
when Locke speaks of delegating power, it is quite clear that an emerging Parliamentarism 
is what he has in mind, and that no matter how power is delegated, whether to a represent- 
ative body or to one man, the ultimate end of the law is "the good of the people." Second 
Treatise, supra note 22, § 142. 
29. Second Treatise, supra note 22, § 142. 
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however, implies "a competency of the maj~rity"~"hat cannot 
easily be juxtaposed with any idea of an enforceable natural or 
civil right. Locke is far clearer in his construct of a theory of 
popular sovereignty-as a by-product of a social contract moving 
man from a state of nature to an organized society-than he is 
regarding the situs of sovereignty inside the c o m m ~ n i t y . ~ ~  
In the hands of Blackstone, moreover, this competency of the 
Lockean majority "to act and conclude the rest"32 emerges as a 
simple prescription for parliamentary supremacy: "So long . . . 
as the English Constitution lasts, we may venture to affirm that 
the power of Parliament is absolute and without control.":'" 
Blackstone states specifically that "there is no court that has 
power to defeat the intent of the legislature, when couched in . . . 
evident and express words."34 This is legislative supremacy in 
pure form, a form that has continued in Great Britain, and is the 
theoretical foundation today for Prime Minister Indira Ghandi's 
reshaping of Indian law and Indian Supreme Court power 
through statutory pro~ess.~" 
Realistically viewed, when Locke is reduced to his implicit 
majoritarianism-as made explicit for Britain by Blackstone's 
paeans to the power of Parliament-Lockean theory affords little 
support for judicial review as an operating system denying legisla- 
tive supremacy when it conflicts with fundamental rights. In the 
alternative, can support be derived from the social contract 
theory of the great French romantic, Jean Jacques Rousseau, who 
asked how man could join a society and keep his freedom too? 
Lifted out of context there are many lines in Rousseau more con- 
ducive to the concept of a non-elective supreme censor, function- 
ing to save the people from themselves, than anything that can 
be found in Locke. 
"Man is born free, and everywhere he is in ~hains,"~%ays 
Rousseau, surveying societies based on false principles. But under 
30. See A. DEGRAZIA, PUBLIC AND REPUBLIC 27 (1951). 
31. As one distinguished commentator has said, Locke's philosophy has "logical diffi- 
culties" and he "regarded the setting up of government as a much less important event 
than the original compact that makes civil society." SABINE, supra note 25, a t  537, 534. 
32. Second Treatise, supra note 22, 9 95. 
33. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 162.
34. Id. at  91. 
35. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1975, 9 E, at  3, col. 1; Washington Post, Aug. 12, 1975, 
4 A, at  12, col. 1. See also Nanda, The Constitutional Framework and the Current Political 
Crisis i n  India, 2 HASTINGS CON. L. Q. 859 (1975). 
36. Rousseau, The Social Contract, in SOCIAL CONTRACT: ESSAYS BY LOCKE, HUME, AND 
R o u s s ~ ~ u  (Oxford U. Press 1948) (opening line) [hereinafter cited as Rousseau]. 
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his alternative, most inaptly called a "social c~ntrac t ,"~ '  man 
could achieve a harmonization of individual desire and social 
good. The key to Rousseau's thought is his creation and juggling 
of a dual concept of "will" as the basis for the social order and 
for man's relation to it: 
The problem is to find a form of association which will defend 
and protect with the whole common force the person and goods 
of each associate, and in which each, while uniting himself with 
all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as free as before. 
Each of us puts his person and all his power in common under 
the supreme direction of the general will, and in our corporate 
capacity, we receive each member as an indivisible part of the 
whole.38 
The general will is not the "common will," for that is just the 
sum of personal desires. The general will is the purified will of the 
community; being the best for the community, it is likewise the 
best for each member of the community. Accordingly, the "real 
will" of each individual is that the "general will" be achieved; as 
a moral being, each individual must "will" the general good (or 
"general will" of the community). This is so despite the fact that 
baser wills, unless corrected, may get in the way. Is it proper, 
then, for the individual to be forced to give up his personal desires 
or common will in preference for his real will, which is part of the 
general will? Of course, says Rousseau, and hence the paradox 
that one can be forced to be free: 
In order then that the social compact may not be an empty 
formula, it tacitly includes the undertaking . . . that whoever 
refuses to obey the general will shall be compelled to do so by 
the whole body. This means nothing less than that he will be 
forced to be free . . . . This alone legitimizes civil undertakings, 
which, without it, would be absurd, tyrannical, and liable to the 
most frightful abuses.39 
All of this is somewhat heavy going, but nevertheless quite 
appealing as a moral concept. Indeed, it is the basis for much 
religion, and it has been viewed as a basis for Immanuel Kant's 
basic construct : 
The universal Law of Right may then be expressed thus: "Act 
externally in such a manner that the free exercise of thy Will 
37. SABINE, supra note 25, at 587. 
38. Rousseau, supra note 36, at 179-80. 
39. Id. at 205-06. 
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may be able to co-exist with the Freedom of all others, according 
to a universal Law."40 
"Kant's categorical imperative," says G.D.H. Cole, "is Rous- 
seau's General Will restated in terms of personal ethical behav- 
ior. "41 
If Rousseau's "forced to be free" concept could be translated 
into governmental terms, i t  would be moral but intrinsically un- 
democratic, for it would vest power in a supreme censor (read, 
"Supreme Court") to "correct" the imperfect "wills" of the mem- 
bers of the body politic, as expressed in legislation, and make 
them follow their "real will." Such a translation was made in the 
involuted thought of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hege1,42 but not by 
Rousseau, a thinker more gifted for suggesting parodox than for 
prescribing governmental form. For Rousseau, native of Geneva, 
the direct democracy of the city-state was the ideal form-a logi- 
cal derivative of his notion that  the "general will" could be 
achieved by a cancelling-out process but could not be "repre- 
~ e n t e d . " ~ ~  Thus, even a t  the conceptual level, his basic ideas are 
not relevant to a large state with multiple, overlapping interest 
clusters. 
Essentially, Rousseau's "general will" is small group altru- 
ism. There is no mechanism for identifying it and authoritatively 
enforcing it. Without a t  least a shadow of enforceable elitism, we 
have no basis in Rousseau for even a conceptual link to judicial 
review, let alone a link to a judiciary constitutionally empowered 
to determine and enforce the "general will," institutionalized as 
substantive due process, against governmental action. 
Therefore, although a t  first glance the seed might seem to be 
there, the idea of a nonpopular body empowered to create and 
impose the grundnorms for a society-whether called natural law, 
natural rights, or general will-is not part of Locke or earlier 
40. I. KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (1796), quoted in M. SPAHR, READINGS IN RECENT 
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 181 (1948). 
41. G.D.H. COLE, ESSAYS IN SOCIAL THEORY 126 (1950). 
42. Hegel states that: 
The state, which is the realized substantive will, having its reality in the partic- 
ular self-consciousness raised to the plane of the universal, is absolutely ra- 
tional. This substantive unity is its own motive and absolute end. In this end 
freedom attains its highest right. This end has the highest right over the individ- 
ual whose highest duty in turn is to be a member of the state. 
G.W.F. HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 4 258 (1821), quoted in M. SPAHR, READINGS IN 
RECENT POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 189 (1948). 
43. G.D.H. COLE, ESSAYS IN SOCIAL THEORY 130 (1950); SABINE, supra note 25, at 592- 
93. 
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natural law theorists, not part of Rousseau, not part of English 
development. 
B. Judicial Review as a "Practical Postulate" 
In view of the influence of both Locke and Blackstone in the 
American colonies, how, Professor Corwin asks, did the United 
States avoid the translation of popular sovereignty into legislative 
supremacy? He offers t~o~explanations:  
In the first place, in the American written Constitution, higher 
law a t  last attained a form which made possible the attribution 
to it of an entirely new sort of validity, the validity of a statute 
emanating from the sovereign people. Once the binding force of 
higher law was transferred to this new basis, the notion of the 
sovereignty of the ordinary legislative organ disappeared auto- 
matically, since that cannot be a sovereign law-making body 
which is subordinate to another law-making body. But in the 
second place, even statutory form could hardly have saved the 
higher law as a recourse for individuals had it not been backed 
up by judicial review. Invested with statutory form and imple- 
mented by judicial review, higher law, as with renewed youth, 
entered upon one of the great periods of its history, and juristi- 
cally the most fruitful one since the days of Justinian.j4 
This quotation has a deceptive simplicity, particularly in its 
almost casual inclusion of judicial review as a natural, necessary, 
and functional derivative of a written Con~titution.~Worwin does 
not explain judicial review, he assumes it. An addition to Cor- 
win's italicization will help bring out the unresolved tensions in 
his construction. Let us stress the idea of a "new sort of validity" 
for higher law, which he proceeds to denote as the "validity of a 
statute emanating from the  sovereign people." 
One immediate problem is that ordinary laws are statutes 
too, and have a more recent emanation from the people than 
ancient constitutional texts. Laying that aside, the Corwin con- 
struction, in its first element, firmly identifies "higher law" for 
American constitutional purposes not with the "embodiment of 
essential and unchanging justice,"46 (which is the common strand 
44. Corwin, supra note 23, a t  409 (emphasis in original). 
45. To be sure, Corwin was only purporting to give a factual explanation, based on 
actual institutional development, to the question he posed. Nevertheless, as the peroration 
of almost 100 pages of natural law analysis from the Greeks forward, it implicitly has a 
normative quality. 
46. Ironically, this phrase is taken from the late Clinton Rossiter's Introduction to 
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of natural law theorizing) but with the "will" of a particular 
people at  a particular time as made manifest in written form. 
Finally, Corwin says, "higher law" could not have been "saved" 
as a "recourse for individuals" against government without judi- 
cial review as a safeguard against legislative sovereignty. 
Chief Justice Marshall too, to be blunt about it, saw judicial 
review as a virtually self-evident derivative of a written constitu- 
t i ~ n . ~ ~  Since the time of Marshall we have come to perceive that 
this self-evident quality of judicial review predicated on a written 
constitution, and hence the justification for an acceptance of ju- 
dicial review itself, is dependent on certain variables: (1) the issue 
before the court; (2) the breadth of discretion which the relevant 
constitutional text confers upon the court; (3) the breadth of 
discretion actually asserted by the court in reaching a decision; 
and (4) the plausibility with which the court can link that discre- 
tion to a constitutional text  or a reasonable inference therefrom. 
For Marshall in Marbury v. M a d i s ~ n , ~ ~  the question of judi- 
cial review was greatly simplified by the nature of the case. Once 
Marshall had determined to interpret the mandamus statute as 
a congressional enlargement of the constitutionally defined origi- 
nal jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, a conflict arose between 
the statute and article I11 of the Constitution. The Constitution 
is starkly clear; in limiting the Court's original jurisdiction to two 
categories, neither of which fitted Mr. Marbury. Further, the 
legislature was tampering with the Court's own status in the sep- 
aration of powers ~ y s t e m ~ ~ - a  system clearly created by the first 
three articles of the Constitution. The exercise of judicial review 
in Marbury, therefore, can be viewed as simply a defensive act 
by the Court to preserve its constitutional status. No act of the 
the 1955 reprinting of the Corwin essay. Rossiter, Prefactory Note to E. CORWIN, THE 
"HIGHER LAW" BACKGROUND OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL L W at  vii (1955). 
47. Marshall justified judicial review in this manner: 
Those, then, who controvert the principle that the constitution is to be consid- 
ered, in court, as a paramount law, are reduced to the necessity of maintaining 
that courts must close their eyes on the constitution and see only the law. 
This doctrine would subvert the very foundation of all written constitu- 
tions. . . . 
That it thus reduces to nothing what we have deemed the greatest improve- 
ment on political institutions-a written constitution-would of itself be suffi- 
cient, in America, where written constitutions have been viewed with so much 
reverence, for rejecting the construction. 
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803). 
48. Id. 
49. See generally Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE 
L.J. 1, 35-36. 
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popular will creating a substantive public policy was blocked by 
the review. The Court simply vindicated the distribution of power 
contemplated by the written Constitution. There was no need to 
even consider invoking broad principles of natural justice which 
had come down through the ages and been embedded, arguably, 
in a constitutional phrase such as "due process." 
In short, the Supreme Court in Marbury can hardly be said 
to have undertaken to create new "higher law" with new substan- 
tive content. Yet, when the Court does do just that, when it 
creates new "higher law" not linked to the Constitution by infer- 
ences historically or logically supportable, is the end product still 
"higher law?" What happens to Corwin's explanation of the 
"higher law" nature of American constitutional law when the 
"higher law"-initially viewed as a "statute emanating from the 
sovereign peoplev-becomes court-made "unwritten law" and 
emanates from temporal and shifting Supreme Court majorities? 
We come thus to a paradox. We justify the Constitution, and 
judicial review of it, on a basis which, if questionable a t  the outset 
from the standpoint both of natural law theory and of actual 
popular s~vere ign ty ,~~  has become wholly unreal today. The Con- 
stitution may be amended in respect to some formal matters such 
as vice-presidential vacancies, but not in respect to any of the 
policy issues which provide the heat and fervor in judicial re- 
view." The popular feeling can express itself through the legisla- 
ture, and to an extent through the President, but not through the 
Court. Yet, through recently developed concepts of the "new 
equal protection" and the "new substantive due process," the 
Court may have power to "amend" the whole system and control 
the basic norms of politics and life. 
From its modest beginnings in 1803, the practice of judicial 
review has come to be a pervasive, even dominating aspect of the 
50. See C. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES (1935). Beard questions the existence of any popular support for the Constitution 
at the time of its ratification. He contends that the Founding Fathers in Philadelphia had, 
with few exceptions, personal economic interest in the outcome of the constitutional text. 
Furthermore, no popular vote ratified the document, and the only popular expression was 
the vote for delegates to the ratifying conventions. Even then, only one-fourth of the 
persons eligible to vote did so. Id. at 325. For a critique of the Beard analysis see R. 
BROWN, CHARLES BEARD AND THE CONSTITUTION (1956). 
51. See Dixon, Article V: The Comatose Article of our Living Constitution, 66 MICH. 
L. REV. 931 (1968). 
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governmental scene, commanding tremendous respect. Although 
courts may become whipping boys for particular decisions, the 
practice of judicial review is a closely held "Linus blanket." At 
the same time, it must be noted that very large areas of review, 
like the Marbury v. Madison case itself, either can be explained 
as part of the operating necessities of our system or for other 
reasons as not involving the kind of open-ended judicial discre- 
tion characterized by substantive due process-fundamental rights 
review. Such areas do not involve the importation of natural law 
theory into the constitutional system. 
A. 'Ynstitutional Review" 
When one reflects on it, a surprisingly large portion of judi- 
cial review is devoted, as was Marbury, to policing or adjusting 
the various institutional arrangements and power-allocating rules 
in our constitutional system. By definition, this invites 
document-related review, not natural justice review. Major com- 
ponents include the following: (1) separation of powers issues; (2) 
intra-branch structure and office-holding issues; (3) federalism 
issues; and (4) commerce-clause-related issues. In broadest 
perspective, the headings can be collapsed into the two broad 
constitutional principles of separation of powers and federalism; 
intra-branch provisions overlap with the former, and the com- 
merce clause is a derivative of the latter. Apart from the question 
of popular sovereignty itself, it is no concern of natural law or 
fundamental justice how power is distributed among the various 
organs constituting the national government, or whether power is 
divided vertically between nation and states. Indeed, Britain and 
France, from which the western world has derived so much politi- 
cal learning, have neither separation of powers nor federalism; 
the United States has both. 
1. Federalism 
Federalism produces a broad range of cases turning not on 
fundamental rights, but on differing theories of how the Founding 
Fathers intended to strike the balance between matters commit- 
ted to the nationwide political power of the central government 
and matters reserved to t.he "parochial" political power of the 
s t a ted2  
52. For a discussion of whether the sub-national nature of the local legislature and 
the corresponding disuniformity in policies raise special problems of "fundamental jus- 
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The most fruitful source of litigation emanating from federal- 
ism has been the never-ending sequence of cases dating from the 
steamboat monopoly case in 1824, Gibbons v. Ogden." In this 
sequence, the commerce clause, which allocates power over for- 
eign or interstate commerce to the Congress, is invoked against 
state regulatory or tax legislation. The cases pose disputes over 
the situs of power in our system, not over the impingement of 
governmental power on fundamental rights. In respect to state 
regulatory or tax legislation impinging on interstate commerce 
values, the concept of federal supremacy creates a necessity for 
judicial action. A court is put in the middle with little constitu- 
tional guidance on the question of "how much" of a burden on 
commerce is "too much."54 The process may degenerate almost 
to arbitration rather than adjudication under agreed principles? 
Nor are there any universal principles of right for the courts 
to grapple with when the federal and state governments them- 
selves "come to blows." The federal government may allege that 
acts of the states threaten to undermine i t  or its instrumental- 
ities, as exemplified by the case involving attempted state taxa- 
tion of the national bank56 and the more recent cases on state 
taxation of federal government contractors." Conversely, the 
states may allege that federal acts threaten to undermine them? 
None of these disputes, no matter how basic to the federal 
structure, require resort to principles of fundamental law for their 
resolution. Because federalism and the interstate commerce con- 
tice" justifying extraordinary judicial intervention through amorphous "substantive due 
process" concepts see notes 155-56 and accompanying text infra. 
53. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). See also Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 
U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829); Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827). 
54. Freund, Forward to T. POWELL, VAGARIES AND VARIETIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION (1956). 
55. See F. RIBBLE, STATE AND NATIONAL POWER OVER COMMERCE (1937). 
56. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); accord, First Agricultural 
Nat'l Bank v. State Tax Comm'n, 392 U.S. 339 (1968). 
57. E.g. ,  Rohr Aircraft Co. v. San Diego County, 362 U.S. 628 (1969); City of Detroit 
v. Murray Corp., 355 U.S. 489 (1958); Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock, 347 U.S. 110 
(1954); Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1 (1941). 
58. A case upsetting to the concept of state autonomy within the state's own sphere 
is Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968). In that case, it was held that federal labor 
standards extend to state-operated schools and hospitals. We have not heard the last of 
this issue, as a case on the Supreme Court's 1975 term docket raises the question whether 
further extension of federal wage standards to  city and state employees, including firemen 
and policemen, is a valid exercise of the commerce power. National League of Cities v. 
Dunlop, Civil No. 74-1812 (D.D.C., Dec. 31, 1974), prob. juris. noted, 420 U.S. 906 (1975) 
(No. 74-878) (argued March 2, 1976 sub non.  National League of Cities v. Usery). 
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cept are themselves optional constitutional principles, litigation 
under them does not reach the level of natural justice review. 
2. Separation of Powers 
Traditionally less productive of litigation than federalism, 
the separation of powers principle, in part because of the troubles 
of the Nixon Presidency, has begun to receive persistent, indeed, 
insistent attention.59 Because executive branch-legislative branch 
disputes at the highest level have commonly been left to the 
processes of cajolery, persuasion, bluff, and political tradeoffs, it 
was not until 1974 that the principle that the President is subject 
to a direct suit while in office was established. At stake in United 
States v. Nixon' was a matter of the highest importance: the 
existence and range of executive confidentiality when the infor- 
mation sought to be protected was deemed relevant to a criminal 
proceeding. On the outcome hinged, in part, the continuance in 
office of a President. In resolving the dispute, the Court rejected 
the immunity doctrine, and although it gave executive privilege 
clear constitutional support, it subordinated it to the need for 
evidence in an ongoing criminal proceeding, This was a momen- 
tous decision. Nevertheless, was it not one document-related and 
supported by principles of compromise derivable from the separa- 
tion of powers concept rather than one founded on principles of 
natural law?61 
-- 
59. A partial list of subjects over which disputes might arise, either related to the 
separation of powers principle itself, or to intra-branch structure and personnel issues, 
would include a t  least the following: executive privilege, Presidential domestic law- 
making powers, Presidential foreign affairs law-making power, Presidential impoundment 
of funds, impeachment, indictment of a high officeholder before impeachment, the par- 
doning power, the pocket veto power, appointment and removal of high Executive officers, 
immunities of Congressmen, the internal discipline power of Congress, and the emolu- 
ments clause. Although the issues raised in these disputes vary in intensity of public 
interest, some concern the foundations of our system. 
60. 418 U.S. 683 (1974). For discussions of the importance of this case see 
Symposium-United States v. Nixon, 22 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 4 (1974); Cox, Executive 
Privilege, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1383 (1974). 
61. As Chief Justice Burger put it: 
[Tlhe separate powers were not intended to operate with absolute inde- 
pendence. . . . To read the Art. I1 powers of the President as providing an 
absolute privilege as against a subpoena essential to enforcement of criminal 
statutes on no more than a generalized claim of the public interest in confiden- 
tiality of nonmilitary and nondiplomatic discussions would upset the constitu- 
tional balance of a "workable government" and gravely impair the role of the 
courts under Art. III. 
418 U.S. at  707. 
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The analogue to the Nixon case, with regard to the status and 
immunities of members of Congress, is Powell u. M c C o r r n a ~ k . ~ ~  
That case raised the question of whether it was within the consti- 
tutional power of the House of Representatives to refuse to seat 
an elected Representative, not because of noncompliance with 
the age, residence, and citizenship requirements of article I, sec- 
tion 2 of the Constitution, but because of conduct deemed detri- 
mental to the proper discharge of legislative duties. On the out- 
come hinged not only the continuance in office of Congressman 
Adam Clayton Powell, but also control of Congress over its inter- 
nal affairs. Here too, however, when faced with this question of 
great import, the Court turned not to principles of natural law for 
its resolution but rather to  a simple interpretation of constitu- 
tional language .63 
Clearly, the separation of powers system was designed, as 
Justice Brandeis once put it, "not to promote efficiency" but to 
foster a creative and self-checking tension among the branches in 
the cause of freedom and balance.64 Predictably, this tension pro- 
duces constitutional disputes over structure and authority of the 
largest dimension. The resulting judicial discretion to act is large, 
but the claims and their resolutions are inevitably squarely 
founded on the document. 
B. Interpretation of "Specific" Guarantees of Liberties and 
Rights 
Apart from disputes under "institutional review,"" where 
the Constitution is the conceded source of applicable (although 
not "fundamental") principles, a wide range of disputes arise 
under such relatively precise constitutional provisions as the con- 
tract, bill of attainder, and ex post facto clauses, or under the 
various components of the Bill of Rights. Although it risks the 
wrath of the  gods t h a t  rule our orthodox constitutional 
jurisprudence to raise the question, one might ask whether the 
Supreme Court's action under some of these provisions is, on 
occasion, more a product of creative leaps and a natural justice 
spirit of review than of logical inference from the document or its 
purposes. While it must be conceded that much litigation under 
these provisions does not leave the courts to roam a t  large, seek- 
62. 395 U.S. 486 (1969). 
63. Id. at 548. 
64. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
65. Cf. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL L W (1969). 
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ing new fundamental values,66 does the Court, as some insist was 
the mark of the Warren Court,67 often go in with a clause but 
come out with a Delphic pronouncement? Can aspects of the 
"new" substantive due process be found here, as well as under the 
due process clause? Full answers to these questions lie beyond the 
scope of this exploratory article but they cannot be entirely ig- 
nored. 
In litigation under specific provisions of the Constitution, the 
tension is between values already deemed important by virtue of 
inclusion in the Constitution and competing current social inter- 
ests in, for example, safety, stability, or law enforcement. Im- 
plicit in the balancing process that occurs is the corollary idea 
that  the principles appealed to are not absolute." However 
strongly some may have felt. concerning the manner in which the 
Court struck the balance when the First Amendment was invoked 
unsuccessfully to limit the congressional power of inve~tigation,~~ 
or successfully to bar the government from making it a crime for 
a Communist to work in a defense facility,70 none could say that 
the Court was working independently with a principle unknown 
to our constitutional order. The reach of the principle was hotly 
disputed, but the principle was there. 
A similar observation could be made about obscenity litiga- 
tion, a most depressing ~ p e c t a c l e . ~ ~  Obscenity is not free speech 
66. For example, whatever one may think of the "clear and present danger" doctrine 
as a judicial gloss on the First Amendment, it is a conscientious attempt to deal with a 
specified constitutional value. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Dennis v. 
United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
67. See Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 
1 (1971); Linde, Judges, Critics and the Realist Tradition, 82 YALE L.J. 227 (1972); cf. Ely, 
Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973). Compare 
these critics of the Warren Court with Wright, Professor Bickel, the Scholarly Tradition, 
and the Supreme Court, 84 HARV. L. REV. 769 (1971). 
68. See Griswold, Absolute Is in the Dark, 8 UTAH L. REV. 167 (1963). The issue of 
whether the First Amendment is an absolute principle is addressed in the Mendelson- 
Frantz debate: Mendelson, On the Meaning of the First Amendment: Absolutes in the 
Balance, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 821 (1962); Frantz, Is the First Amendment Law?-A Reply to 
Professor Mendelson, 51 CALIF. L. REV. 729 (1963); Mendelson, The First Amendment and 
the Judicial Process: A Reply to Mr. Frantz, 17 VAND. L. REV. 479 (1964). 
69. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); Watkins v. United States, 354 
U.S. 178 (1957). 
70. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967). See also Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 
559 (1965) (three different prosecutions arising out of a mass demonstration in front of a 
Baton Rouge jail were overturned on First Amendment grounds). 
71. I t  is not, however, without its humorous moments. Note, for example, the 
Ginzburg rule that "it is all right to give it away, but you can't sell it." Ginzburg v. United 
States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966). 
Ginzburg was convicted under a federal obscenity statute for using the mails to sell 
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we are told;72 but answering the implicit question of what is ob- 
scenity has operated to turn judges' chambers into "dirty movie 
houses" and required the use of a separate locked room for ob- 
scenity briefs and related materials in the Supreme Court build- 
ing. This unsatisfactory state of affairs, unimproved over a 
fifteen-year period, has recently led Justice Brennan to abandon 
the majority position he had supported and to join the position 
of former Justice Douglas and others in according virtual carte 
blanche to obscenity under the First Amendment.73 Whether this 
is forsaking the "low road," as Justice Douglas put it in applaud- 
ing Justice Brennan's switch, necessarily depends upon one's 
point of view. An alternative to ease the burden of the Court in 
this field would be to revert to a very strict definition of obscenity, 
delegate the matter to local community juries, and then tightly 
limit review .74 
For our present purpose, the important point is that an ex- 
pressed constitutional value is a t  stake. While a majority of the 
three publications: Eros, Liason, and The Housewife's Handbook on Selective 
Promiscuity. Although it was questionable whether the materials were themselves ob- 
scene, the Court held that they were obscene in the context of the manner in which the 
publications were sold and their "characteristics as a whole." The Court took into account 
the fact that the advertising and editorial formats appealed solely to the prurient interests 
of the potential readers. Part of the evidence of "pandering" was the effort of Ginzburg 
to secure mailing privileges from post offices a t  Intercourse, Pa. and Blue Ball, Pa. in order 
to have the post mark on the publications. In short, the "leer of the sensualist" permeated 
the advertising. 
72. In Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), Justice Brennan expressed the then 
current view of the Supreme Court in these words: 
All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance-unorthodox 
ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opin- 
ion-have the full protection of the guaranties [sic], unless excludable because 
they encroach upon a limited area of more important interests. But implicit in 
the history of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly 
without redeeming social importance . . . . We hold that obscenity is not within 
the area of constitutionally protected speech or press. 
Id. a t  484-85. 
73. See Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 73, 113 (1973) (Brennan, Stew- 
art, & Marshall, JJ., dissenting). Brennan, the author of the majority opinions in Roth 
and Ginzburg, made a complete turnabout in Slaton. He noted that the Court's experience 
after Roth almost required abandonment of the effort to determine which materials are 
obscene and that therefore the Court should reconsider the Roth postulate that there 
exists a class of "sexually oriented expression" that may be suppressed. But even assum- 
ing the existence of that class of materials, Brennan concluded that "the concept of 
'obscenity' cannot be defined with sufficient specificity . . . to prevent substantial erosion 
of protected speech as a by-product of the attempt to suppress unprotected speech, and 
to avoid costly institutional harms." Id. a t  103. 
74. This is the apparent goal of the current Court majority as expressed in Chief 
Justice Burger's majority opinion in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
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Supreme Court is still reluctant to give a free reign to obscenity, 
too broad a repressive policy would reach a fair amount of legiti- 
mate literature and art. Wherever the balance is struck, the spe- 
cific constitutional guarantee of free speech provides the 
legitimizing basis for the Court's pronouncement. 
In principle it can be suggested that there is less need in the 
area of "specific" freedoms and rights than in institutional review 
for the Court to push beyond the bounds of reasonable inferences 
from the document. Commerce litigation concerning, for exam- 
ple, state taxes on interstate business puts the Court in the mid- 
dle. I t  must reach a decision even if the competing claims are 
equally balanced and there is no clear "law." In respect to "spe- 
cific" guarantees of rights, however, there is less necessity to act 
in every case. I t  is up to the challenger to make his case. If it is 
not clear that the Constitution, read in the light of its history and 
purposes, supports his claim, he should not win. 
In constitutional litigation, this offshoot of ordinary burden 
of proof concepts was a t  one time viewed as an especially impor- 
tant  guiding principle-the "doctrine of reasonable doubt." 
Indeed, this principle was a canon of constitutional interpretation 
(albeit strained by the aberration of Lochner) in constitutional 
law casebooks as late as the 1940's and early 1 9 5 0 ' ~ . ~ ~  It managed 
to survive the Lochner era, and indeed was marvelously propped 
up by the various decisions sustaining the major New Deal inno- 
vations under the contract clause,76 the commerce clause,77 and 
75. See, e.g., W. DODD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL L W 52 (5th ed. 
1954). The doctrine of reasonable doubt in constitutional litigation operates much as it 
does in criminal law: a statute should not be ruled invalid unless the conflict with the 
Constitution is clear beyond a reasonable doubt. The application of the standard raises 
certain questions. For instance, does a 5-4 decision invalidating a state law show that there 
still exists a reasonable doubt? The apparent answer is no, although various commentators 
have argued for Court restraint or for the requirement of a supermajority. But cf. Johnson 
v. Louisiana, 406 U S .  356 (1972), where in a criminal case, the Court held, 5-4, that a 
non-unanimous jury verdict (9-3) did not violate due process by circumventing the "be- 
yond a reasonable doubt" standard. 
Regarding majority verdicts by a minority of the full court (some members being 
absent), Mr. Chief Justice Marshall wrote in City of New York v. Miln, 33 U S .  (8 Pet.) 
118, 122 (1834) that: 
The practice of this court is not (except in cases of absolute necessity) to deliver 
any judgment in cases where constitutional questions are involved, unless four 
judges concur in opinion, thus making the decisions that of a majority of the 
whole court. 
Note also the remonstrance by Justice Blackmun against action by a "bob-tailed 
court," in North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chemical, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975). 
76. See, e.g., Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1954). 
77. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 
U.S. 100 (1941). 
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the tax-spend clause.78 
The demise of the "doctrine of reasonable doubt" is a major 
event in modern constitutional law that has been little noticed. 
The process began in the First Amendment cases. Such cases 
did not come to the Supreme Court in any numbers until 1925. 
In that year, the Gitlow v. New York70 decision incorporating the 
First Amendment into the Fourteenthso opened the door to 
numerous challenges to actions taken by state and local govern- 
m e n t ~ . ~ '  Despite a long rear-guard action by Justice Frank- 
furter" and some of his colleagues, it has come to be a well- 
accepted tenet of the Supreme Court that when a claim touches 
the First Amendment, a "preferred freedom" is invoked. More 
recently, this "preferred freedoms" concept has spread to other 
fields deemed " f~ndamenta l "~~  and to the "fundamental rights" 
branch of the "new" substantive equal p r ~ t e c t i o n . ~ ~  
It may well be that such subtle shifts in burdens of proof and 
presumptions in constitutional cases are a most important aspect 
of the substantive due process spirit, even if not a t  first perceived 
as such. Little noticed by laymen, because seemingly mere arcane 
technicalities, such shifts materially affect  outcome^.^ In this 
78. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U S .  548 (1937). 
79. 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
80. The validity of that incorporation has recently been denied by the Supreme Court 
of Utah in a decision reminiscent of re-enactments of 100-year-old civil war battles-where 
the participants forget the make-believe nature of the engagement. State v. Phillips, 540 
P.2d 936 (Utah 1975). Cf. Maryland Petition Comm. v. Johnson, 265 F. Supp. 823 (D. Md. 
1967) (an unsuccessful attack on the constitutionality of the Fourteenth Amendment 
itself). 
81. Justice Stone's footnote 4 in his dissent in United States v. Carolene Products 
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) is generally conceded to be the starting point for the 
"preferred freedoms" concept under the First Amendment. Similar sentiments were ex- 
pressed in Ex parte Endo, 323 U S .  283 (1944) and Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 
173 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
82. See, e.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U S .  77, 90 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
Frankfurter traces the emergence of the "mischievous phrase" of "preferred freedoms," 
concluding that the concept has never been supported by a majority of the Court. He goes 
on to note that "the objection to . . . the phrase . . . is that it expresses a complicated 
process of constitutional adjudication by a deceptive formula . . . making for mechanical 
jurisprudence." Id. a t  96. See also McKay, The Preference For Freedom, 34 N.Y.U.L. REV. 
1182 (1959). 
83. This spread of the "preferred freedoms" approach is exemplified by litigation 
undergirding with special warning requirements the criminal procedure guarantee that a 
confession be voluntary. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U S .  436 (1966). 
84. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U S .  618 (1969) (right to travel); Karst, Invidious 
Discrimination: Justice Douglas and the Return of the "Natural-Law-Due-Process" 
Formula, 16 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 716 (1969). 
85. It is in this context that the "overbreadth doctrine" should be examined. The 
doctrine is a product of the fundamental rights approach, especially in the area of First 
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way the bench asserts, sub silentio but powerfully, its own per- 
ception of what is merely a constitutional value and thus safely 
left to the ordinary process of litigation, and what is "fundamen- 
tal" and thus necessarily placed on a pedestal. 
Surely, the recent federal circuit court decision finding an 
unconstitutional infringement of freedom of expression in an 
anti-"topless" dancing ordinance would seem asinine without the 
pedestal effect of the preferred freedoms r a t i ~ n a l e . ~ ~  The Second 
Circuit noted that "there is only a modicum of expression" in- 
volved in dancing topless. "But that modicum is one of constitu- 
tional significance, both to the dancers who earn a livelihood by 
providing their particular form of entertainment, and, perhaps 
more, to the customers . . . who for a variety of reasons . . . 
choose not to avail themselves of diversions deemed more tasteful 
or culturally rewarding by others."87 Examples in the Supreme 
Court itself of decisions that could not have been made easily 
without a rather strong "preferred freedoms" gloss on the First 
Amendment freedoms. See, e.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972); Coates v. Cincin- 
nati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971). See also Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964) 
(doctrine applied to right to travel and right of association). The decisional technique 
employed in "overbreadth" cases is not to adjudicate the facts of the case actually before 
the Court, but to imagine all the situations to which the statute by its terms "might" seem 
to apply, and to nullify the statute if any such imagined application would violate a 
fundamental right. Thus, overbreadth litigation is "might be" litigation. It smacks of an 
advisory opinion with a bite, and the immediate offender may escape deserved censure. 
In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973), and a companion case, Civil Service 
Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973), divided 
courts-expressing a more moderate spirit than found in Aptheker-sustained statutes 
restricting partisan political activity by public employees and rejected attacks that the 
statutes were void for being fatally overbroad. The majorities found that even though some 
proscribed activities might be protected by the First Amendment, invalidating the entire 
statutes was not warranted. The Court said that "particularly where conduct and not 
merely speech are involved we believe that the overbreadth of a statute must not only be 
real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep." 
413 U.S. a t  615. 
The dissenters in Broadrick took a different view of the overbreadth doctrine, noting 
that in a free speech context, "narrowly drawn statutes" are required to avoid "a chilling 
effect" on First Amendment freedoms. They disagreed with the majority's distinguishing 
between conduct and pure speech where both are protected by the First Amendment. 
86. Salem Inn, Inc. v. Frank, 522 F.2d 1045 (2d Cir. 1975). 
87. Id. a t  1048. See also Attwood v. Purcell, 402 F. Supp. 231 (D. Ariz. 1975). There 
a law making it a crime to "wilfully and lewdly" expose one's private parts in any place 
"where there are present other persons to be offended or annoyed thereby" was voided on 
First Amendment grounds of vagueness and overbreadth. 
So far the Supreme Court has avoided meeting the nude dancing issue frontally, but 
has indicated that although "nude dancing may involve only the barest minimum of 
protected expression," it "might be" entitled to First Amendment protection under some 
circumstances. Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975). 
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Amendment include the recent series of "flag" cases.RR In this 
same tradition of "offensive" protest is Cohen v. C a l i f ~ r n i a , ~ ~  in 
which a majority of the Court held the wearing of a jacket bearing 
the phrase "F - the Draft" in a corridor outside a courtroom 
in Los Angeles to be constitutionally protected from a prosecution 
for "maliciously and wilfully disturbing the peace or quiet of any 
neighborhood or person [by] offensive conduct." 
The point is not that these decisions and others like them are 
wrong. But they are extreme, and the question is whether they 
are not unsupported by the text or purposes of the First Amend- 
ment absent the judicial "preferred freedoms" gloss. Indeed, in 
the cause of protecting the rather petty conduct challenged in 
these cases, may not these decisions cheapen the value they are 
intended to promote? The essence of humor is an intellectual 
grasp of incongruity. Is there a lack of a sense of humor in these 
recent judicial postures concerning bare-breasted dancing and 
obscene words on jackets in courtrooms? 
Although beyond the scope of this article, i t  might be sug- 
gested that a number of judicial invalidations of governmental 
power in recent years, even though nominally supported by a 
clause more precise on its face than "due process," are as much 
candidates for inclusion under the "new substantive due process" 
rubric as are the more recent decisions on birth control and abor- 
tion. The test for including such cases would be whether the 
ground of decision is reasonably supported by the history and 
purposes of the relevant clause, or by any meaning logically infer- 
able from its history and purpose or its function in respect to 
other parts of the constitutional order.g0 This is not to say that 
all of the creative decisions are wrong. It is merely to suggest that 
because of reliance on a clause that does not speak to the point, 
some recent decisions are very poorly rationalized and supported 
by little more than a "preferred freedoms" crutch. 
Some of the decisions may be explained by specially protec- 
tive judicial feelings concerning Vietnam protest activities. Un- 
popular policies, such as the Vietnam War, cause over-reaction 
88. Spence v. Washington, 418 U S .  405 (1974); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 
(1974); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969). 
89. 403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
90. Cf. Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 
920, 949 (1973). Ely makes a similar point this way: 'YBlefore the Court can get to the 
"balancing" stage, before it can worry about the next case or the case after that (or even 
about its institutional position) it is under an obligation to trace its premises to the charter 
from which it derives its authority." (Emphasis in original). 
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that is not confined to the political arena.g1 Yet this explanation 
cannot account for decisions such as the one overturning an anti- 
"topless" dancing ordinance. Unlike the politically relevant 
"communication" on the jacket of the boy outside the California 
courtroom, there was no message on the bosom of the barroom 
dancer .92 
Of course, it may be argued, and it has been, that those who 
criticize the courts for non-Constitution-based jurisprudence in 
respect to some decisions involving the Bill of Rights and Four- 
teenth Amendment merely disagree with the particular results 
reached by the Court.g3 Conversely, it may be argued that those 
who agree with the Court's results are especially prone to dis- 
cover-with the Cour te i the r  an historicalg4 or inferentialg%exus 
with the "purpose" of a constitutional clause or set of clauses. 
C.  "Incorporation Doctrine" Cases: Subtle Reinforcers of 
"Fundamental Rights" Reasoning 
A special, discretionary "natural justice" problem arises 
with respect to the question of "incorporation" of some or all of 
the Bill of Rights provisions into the Fourteenth Amendment, 
making them enforceable against the states as well as the na- 
tional g o ~ e r n m e n t . ~ ~  Despite the continuance of the official doc- 
trine that the Bill of Rights, as such, limits only the national 
government, most of the actual restrictions apply today with 
equal force to the states. This feat has been accomplished in our 
time, and most of it within the last fifteen years, by the Supreme 
Court's "finding" that the single word "liberty" in the due pro- 
91. In an analogous field, we have not yet begun to count up the case-precedent 
damage to the ongoing Presidency caused by President Nixon and the manner of his 
downfall. Cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); National Treasury Employees 
Union v. Nixon, 492 F.2d 587 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
92. Unless in hedonistic terms, some things speak for themselves. 
93. See, e.g., Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE 
L.J. 920, 949 n.147 (1973). 
94. Justice Black's penchant for rewriting history in order to achieve new constitu- 
tional doctrine nominally by "logical derivation" from the document rather than by overt 
"natural justice" reasoning has been criticized by Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit 
Love Affair, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 119. 
95. See Justice Goldberg's opinion in Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 286-318 (1964). 
96. The "taking" clause in the Fifth Amendment seems to have been the first clause 
incorporated, at  least in effect if not in the exact language of incorporation. See Chicago, 
B. & Q.R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). The free speech principle in the First 
Amendment was "assumed" to be part of the Fourteenth Amendment in Gitlow v. New 
York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925), and never doubted thereafter. Most of the "incorporation" 
debate, however, has concerned the numerous guarantees relating to criminal procedure. 
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cess clause of the Fourteenth Amendment contains all of the 
basic thoughts laboriously spelled out by the Founding Fathers 
in the Bill of Rights. Put another way, a "substantive" approach 
to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has his- 
torically been the necessary precondition of having a receptacle 
available into which could be poured the Bill of Rights in whole 
or in part.97 
The relevant point here is that the Supreme Court has 
shaped the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment into 
almost a carbon copy of the Bill of Rights by a process of reason- 
ing that has preserved maximum discretion to itself. Although 
not always admitted,gs this is the spirit of "natural justice" review 
par excellence. This may be good, as it is in the view of some 
commentators, because it provides a basis to avoid straitjacket- 
ing modern criminal procedure in the outworn dress of old 
forms,99 but it certainly should be recognized for what it is. 
In broadest perspective, there are three possible approaches 
to the "incorporation" question. Each approach would secure to 
the Court a different degree of discretion to promulgate a judge- 
made code of rights and procedures restricting state and local 
governments. The first, which would provide the least discretion 
on details-despite a major impact in result-would consist of a 
simple pronouncement that "total incorporation" of the Bill of 
Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment was the intent of the 
drafters. Justice Black espoused this view in his debate with Jus- 
tice Frankfurter in their opinions in Adamson v. California,loO 
97. See Harris, Due Process of Law, 42 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 32 (1966). 
98. Note Justice Frankfurter's opinion that a fundamental rights-natural law focus 
does "not leave judges a t  large"; because the "vague contours of the Due Process Clause 
. . . . [are] deeply rooted in reason and in the compelling traditions of the legal profes- 
sion. . . . [due process] is not to be derided as resort to a revival of 'natural law'." 
Rochin v. California, 342 U S .  165, 170-71 (1952). 
Although concurring in the result on the basis of the as yet unincorporated Fifth 
Amendment self-incrimination principle, Justice Black sharply criticized the majority 
opinion because he found "no express constitutional language granting judicial power to 
invalidate every state law of every kind deemed 'unreasonable' or contrary to the Court's 
notion of civilized decencies." Id. a t  176. (Emphasis in original). 
99. Cf. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 
929 (1965) (warning that the discretionary nature of the "incorporation" doctrine may lead 
the Court to devise too detailed a code of criminal procedure-constitutionalized and 
impregnable). 
100. 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). See also FLACK, THE ADOITION OF 
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1908). 
For a forceful criticism of Justice Black's "historical" finding that the Fourteenth 
Amendment's purpose was to make the Bill of Rights applicable to the states see Fairman, 
Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?-The Original 
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where, for the time being, the Court refused to incorporate the 
self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment into the Four- 
teenth?' In the view of one perceptive commentator, there 
was an aspect of special pleading to Black's position. A straight- 
forward process of "total incorporation" avoids the need to ex- 
pand the Fourteenth Amendment by "substantive due process- 
fundamental rights" reasoning in order to find room for the Bill 
of Rights. Thus, by "total incorporation," Justice Black could 
have his "incorporation" cake but not have to eat substantive 
due process with all its connotations of legitimating Lochner-type 
attacks on economic and social legislation.ln2 
An intermediate approach, often taken and often called 
"selective incorporation," is to engage in a natural justice process 
of reasoning to ascertain whether the particular Bill of Rights 
clause invoked constitutes a fundamental right. If the answer is 
"yes," then the whole clause-with meaning identical to its 
meaning in federal trials-applies to the states. This is actually 
a theory of total incorporation of "selected" Bill of Rights clauses. 
Justice Brennan and others have championed this approach.InD 
The third approach may be called "partial incorporation of 
selected Bill of Rights clauses," or simply "selective selective 
incorporation." Guided by a "fundamental value" reasoning pro- 
cess, the Court applies only the essential core of the selectively 
incorporated Bill of Rights clause to the states. By way of exam- 
ple, when the search and seizure clause of the Fourth Amendment 
was incorporated "selectively," the accompanying federal exclu- 
sionary rule was left behind,lo4 although later picked up.'"'. Of 
course, insofar as fundamentality is the basic test under this ap- 
proach, the exclusionary rule could be dropped again in a reas- 
sessment of "fundamentality . "Io6 
Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949). Justice Black replied to Professor Fairman in 
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 162 (1968) (Black, J., concurring). 
101. Incorporation did occur later. See, e.g., Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965); 
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). 
102. See generally Morrison, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill 
of Rights?-The Judicial Interpretation, 2 STAN. L. REV. 140, 167 (1949). 
103. See, e.g., Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3 (1964) (Brennan, J.) . 
104. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). 
105. In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the exclusionary rule was applied to the 
states but no rationale commanded majority support. 
106. Such a reassessment seems possible in light of the especially strong disenchant- 
ment with the exclusionary rule among members of the Burger Court. See, e.g., Chief 
Justice Burger's dissents in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); Bivens v. 
Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 
443 (1971). Significantly, the Court has declined to extend the exclusionary rule to grand 
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The "selective selective incorporation" approach has oper- 
ated in an especially interesting fashion in the recent federaliza- 
tion of jury trial cases. The Supreme Court has held that the 
Fourteenth Amendment requires jury trials a t  the state level too, 
even for minor offenses, because the Sixth Amendment right to 
jury trial is " f~ndarnen ta l . "~~~  But the details of jury trial are not 
"fundamental." Hence, the states are free to allow conviction on 
non-unanimous verdicts,lo8 and to experiment with juries of fewer 
than 12.1°9 But a t  this point the "selective selective incorpora- 
tion" approach seems to boomerang and shrink the federal right 
in the federal courts too. Although federal courts traditionally 
utilize only 12-person juries and unanimous verdicts, these can 
become optional practicesl10 since they are neither spelled out in 
jury proceedings. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974). The issue could be a 
major one in the current term of the Court. While this article was a t  press, the Court on 
Dec. 9, 1975 decided Michigan v. Mosley, 96 S. Ct. 321 (1975), upholding admissibility of 
an inculpatory statement made after two "Miranda warnings" and no request for a lawyer. 
Arrested in connection with several robberies, Mosley received Miranda warnings, dec- 
lined to discuss the robberies, and questioning ceased. Later, another detective gave fresh 
warnings, then questioned Mosley about an unrelated murder and obtained the statement 
used at  Mosley's trial for murder. See also Ohio v. Gallagher, 38 Ohio St. 2d 291, 313 
N.E.2d 396 (1974), cert. granted, 420 U.S. 1003 (1975) (confession to parole officer after 
Miranda warnings given by police); Williams v. Brewer, 509 F.2d 227 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. 
granted, 96 S. Ct. 561 (1975) (questioning of accused out of presence of counsel after 
admonition by counsel to police to refrain from questioning). See generally Cord, Neo- 
Incorporation: The Burger Court and the Due Process Clause, 44 Fordham L. Rev. 215 
(1975). 
107. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). In his opinion for the majority, 
Justice White sought to recast the "fundamentality" test of selective incorporation from 
the "very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty" formulation in Palko v. Connecticut, 
302 U.S. 319 (1937), to a formulation phrased as "necessary to an Anglo-American regime 
of ordered liberty." Id. a t  149 n.14. This purported shift from a "universal" natural justice 
focus as in Palko to an American focus in Duncan is a difference more semantical than 
real. The important thing is that the judicial search still is for "fundamentality," a wholly 
judge-controlled process. Because we are all more culture-bound than we can admit, the 
difference in "fundamentality" as between a "natural justice" focus and an "American 
justice" focus may be indistinguishable. Indeed, Justices Harlan and Stewart, dissenting, 
seemed to concur in resting incorporation analysis on "the American traditions and our 
system of government," 391 U.S. a t  176, but they read the tea leaves quite differently on 
"fundamentality" in respect to the need for jury trial for lesser offenses. 
108. See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (a 10-2 conviction does not violate 
the "incorporated" jury trial guarantee of the Sixth Amendment); Johnson v. Louisiana, 
406 U.S. 356 (1972) (due process was not violated by a 9-3 conviction in a case tried prior 
to the incorporation of the Sixth Amendment into the Fourteenth). 
109. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (6-person jury upheld as not violating 
"incorporated" Sixth Amendment). 
110. The odd split in the Court in Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972), and 
Justice Powell's "swing vote," apparently left jury unanimity as a requirement in federal 
criminal trials but not in state criminal trials. As to the size of federal juries, however, 
the Court has recently sanctioned the use of smaller than 12-person juries in civil cases. 
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the Bill of Rights nor found to be fundamental. 
Other results also flow from the persistence of the idea that 
only the "fundamental rights" embodied in the Bill of Rights are 
part of the "basic liberties" of the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
natural justice rationale for incorporating a particular clause 
tends to spill over into the merits. It provides a basis for-and in 
a subtle way may actually induce-the Court to remake the 
clause on an expanded "natural justice" basis, once it is incorpo- 
rated. A good example is Malloy v. Hogan,ll1 where, in the process 
of incorporating the Fifth Amendment privilege against compul- 
sory self-incrimination, the Court expanded considerably the fed- 
eral right itself.lt2 Moreover, the unceasing focus on the question 
of "fundamentality" has prevented the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment from being limited by the Bill of Rights. 
As a result, the clause has remained a source of new fundamental 
principles with which to challenge new forms of governmental 
action, or old forms that no previous generation thought of chal- 
lenging.l13 
In short, the process of incorporating substantially all of the 
"specific" guarantees of the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth 
- -- - - - 
Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973) (use of a 6-person jury upheld). For a general 
discussion of the danger of the "reverse incorporation" effect see Morgan, From Maxwell 
to Duncan-Progress or Regression?, in LAW AND JUSTICE: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ROBERT S. 
RANKIN 149 (G. Beck ed. 1970). 
In light of these untoward problems, this author tentatively suggests that a fourth 
approach to the incorporation process may be preferable and would have a limiting effect 
on judicial discretion. This approach would start with Justice Black's "total incorpora- 
tion" premise, but then use non-fundamentality-supported by considerations drawn 
from another constitutional principle, federalism-to exempt the states from certain de- 
tails associated with the Bill of Rights. In effect, this would be Justice Black plus the 
recent jury trial cases, and would accord with Mr. Justice Powell's desire not to change 
the traditional practices in trials held in federal courts. 
111. 378 U.S. 1 (1964). 
112. Malloy had already pleaded guilty to the gambling misdemeanor of "pool- 
selling." Therefore, when he refused to answer questions about events surrounding his 
arrest and conviction, the state court found no reasonable fear of further incrimination. 
Justice Brennan, for the Court, was willing to hypothesize that if the questions elicited 
the names of Malloy's associates in the prior offense, if the associates were still committing 
offenses, and if Malloy had violated his probation by joining in these offenses, Malloy 
might have reasonable fear of fresh incrimination. Id. a t  12-13. 
In dissent, Justice White expostulated that the Court had virtually created a new 
absolute. "Theoretically, under some unknown but perhaps possible conditions any fact 
is potentially incriminating. But if this be the rule, there obviously is no reason for the 
judge, rather than the witness, to pass on the claim of privilege. The privilege becomes a 
general one against answering distasteful questions." Id. a t  37. 
113. Note the "incorporation-plus" language of Justice Murphy in Adamson v. Cali- 
fornia, 332 U.S. 46,124 (1947). See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,171 (1973) (Rehnquist, 
J., dissenting). 
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Amendment has not been one of immaculate conception. 
Achieved by use of a "fundamental rights" concept with explicit 
natural law-natural justice overtones, the way has been opened 
for an ongoing jurisprudence focusing far less on the documentary 
and historic origins of constitutional rights and guarantees than 
on values perceived by the Court as natural and necessary for the 
good of society. Indeed, the heady thought that the judiciary may 
be the conscience of the people114 flows far more easily from the 
value-questing process of natural justice reasoning than from the 
tedious process of documentary analysis required to ascertain 
original meanings and purposes and the reach of plausible infer- 
ence .'I5 
This overview treatment, up to this point, has dealt not just 
with substantive due process but with the general question of 
unguided judicial discretion which that term evokes. It has been 
observed that the initial acceptance of judicial review was on a 
basis more practical than principled, thus begging rather than 
facing the question of judicial discretion. In fact, the relationship 
of "natural justice" to the written text of the Constitution, and 
the institution of review itself, has never been sorted out. Hence, 
this article suggests that, apart from the special area of "institu- 
tional review," a persistent tendency toward loose fundamental- 
values thinking has been a constant enticement toward broad 
judicial discretion, even though natural justice has never been 
conceived of as an enforceable body of law. 
The focus of the preceding analysis has been on what might 
be called the substantive due process spirit, or better, the natural 
justice spirit, rather than on cases commonly labeled as substan- 
tive due process cases. I t  is time now to pay brief heed to the one 
area where the Supreme Court has overtly used the due process 
clause, in its nonprocedural cast, to nullify legislation because it 
was arbitrary, extreme, or unreasonable, or because i t  trenched 
on fundamental values: namely, the Lochner v. New York116 line 
114. The thought is captured in Justice Field's statement that "this Court stands for 
the whole country, and as such it is truly 'of the people, by the people, and for the 
people.' " Correspondence Between Mr. Justice Field and the Other Members of the Court 
with Regard to his Retiring from the Bench, Oct. 12, 1897, 42 L. Ed. 1219, 1221. See 
generally BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1970). 
115. See note 90 and accompanying text supra. 
116. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). See Strong, The Economic Philosophy of Lochner: Emerg- 
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of cases. The focus then will shift to some significant recent devel- 
opments by which the Court, perhaps with less intellectual hon- 
esty than demonstrated in the Lochner-line of cases, has devel- 
oped even more stringent doctrines for overturning legislation and 
sharing policymaking power. 
A. Lochner and Company 
If the Court goes out of its way, with little or no constitu- 
tional warrant, to protect someone from an "uncommonly silly 
law," as Justice Stewart put it in the contraceptives case, 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 117 there can be little objection. This 
is a good example of use of the substantive due process con- 
cept to take care of the "unprovided-for case" beyond the 
reach of explicit constitutional guarantees. But this is not what 
was wrong with the sequence of cases typified by Lochner u. 
New York. Those cases involved invalidations not of old, 
anachronistic, "silly" laws but  of recent attempts of the 
state legislatures118 and the Congressllg to grapple with certain 
impacts of the industrial revolution on workers,120 business 
ence, Embrasure and Emasculation, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 419 (1973). He approvingly quotes 
Mr. Justice Douglas' off-the-bench statement that "the problem of constitutional adjudi- 
cation . . : is to keep the power of government unrestrained by the social or economic 
theories that one set of judges may entertain." But, Strong adds, Douglas, "of all post- 
Nebbia Justices has experienced the seductiveness of transgressions of that ideal." Id. a t  
455. 
117. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). For a discussion of this extremely odd case see notes 186-89 
and accompanying text infra. 
118. See, e .g . ,  New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932) (requirement that 
ice manufacturers obtain a certificate of convenience and necessity prior to entering into 
business); Ribnick v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350 (1928) (regulation of employment agency fees 
voided because such a business is "not affected with the public interest"); Adams v. 
Tanner, 244 U.S. 590 (1917) (ban against employment agencies which collected fees held 
to be an "arbitrary and oppressive" prohibition of a useful business); Coppage v. Kansas, 
236 U.S. 1 (1915) (prohibition of "yellow dog" contracts an unconstitutional infringement 
of "right to make contracts"); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (law prohibiting 
employment in bakeries for more than 60 hours per week an "unnecessary and arbitrary" 
interference with the right to contract); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897) (statute 
prohibiting any act in the state to effect insurance on any property in Louisiana unless 
company had complied with Louisiana law deprived persons of liberty without due pro- 
cess). 
119. See, e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U S .  525 (1923) (District of Columbia 
statute prescribing minimum wages for women overturned as a "naked, arbitrary exer- 
cise" of legislative power without regard to the contracts or the nature of the business); 
Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (ban on "yellow dog" contracts for interstate 
railroad employees overturned as an unconstitutional interference with liberty of con- 
tract). 
120. See, e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U S .  525 (1923) (low wages); Lochner 
v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (long working days; unhealthy working conditions). 
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competitors,121 and consumers.122 Not all these invalidations were 
based on traditionally accepted principles, such as the objective 
concept that if ratemaking results in regulations so onerous as to 
be confiscatory, they lack due process or even trench on the "pub- 
lic taking" concept.ln Rather, the tests of constitutionality em- 
ployed were so vague that a quite inconsistent pattern of invalida- 
tions re~u1ted. l~~ Inconsistency in judicial decision is a sign that 
a legal standard is either deficient or absent, and that a court, 
acting creatively, is embarked on a policy formation process with- 
out the aid of the legislative mechanism.125 
The "liberty of contract" principle with which the Court met 
the early wages and hours legislation is not so much a decisional 
principle as a slogan, for the right to contract has always been 
subject to restraints imposed to achieve higher social good. For 
example, the Statute of Frauds regulates contracting form,Iz6 con- 
tracts to commit a crime are void ab initio,12' the concept of a just 
price for services has ancient lineage in the common law,12s and 
so on. Given this reality about restraints upon contracting, and 
given the absence of explicit constitutional guidance (unless we 
reach the confiscation concept), how could the judiciary develop 
a workable standard to decide when to negate, and when not to 
121. See, e.g., Weaver v. Palmer Bros., 270 U.S. 402 (1926) (a state law prohibiting 
manufacturers from using shoddy in bedding was struck down). 
122. See, e.g., Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235 (1929) (regulation of gaso- 
line price voided); Tyson & Brother v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418 (1927) (regulation of ticket 
resale price voided); Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504 (1924) (regulation of weights 
of loaves of bread voided). 
123. See The Railroad Commission Cases, 116 U.S. 307 (1886) (confiscatory rates); 
Chicago, M. & St. P. Railway Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1890). See also Pennsyl- 
vania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 269 U.S. 393 (1922); cf. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 
U S .  590 (1962). 
124. See cases collected in CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, 
THE CONSTITUTION F THE UNITED STATES, S. DOC. NO. 92-82, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1332-35 
(1973). 
125. The Lochner era also recognized the existence of some "personal freedoms." 
See, e.g., Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (right to educate children as one 
chooses); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (right to study German language in a 
private school); cf. Whitney v. California, 264 U.S. 357,373-80 (1927) (Brandeis & Holmes, 
J.J., concurring) (right of free speech); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (Holmes 
& Brandeis, J.J., dissenting) (right of free speech). 
126. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Williams, 153 So. 2d 759 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963); Repub- 
lic Iron & Steel Co. v. State, 160 Ind. 379, 66 N.E. 1005 (1903). 
127. See, e.g., Horbach v. Coyle, 2 F.2d 702 (8th Cir. 1924); Hoggard v. Dickerson, 
180 Mo. App. 70, 165 S.W. 1135 (1914). 
128. See the discussion of common law principles in Reagan v. Farmers' Loan and 
Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362 (1894). See also Read, Mercantilism: The Old English Pattern of 
a Controlled Economy, in THE CONSTITUTION RECONSIDERED 63 (C. Read rev. ed. 1968). 
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negate, a legislative act of social or economic regulation? For after 
all, as Holmes put it, "law is not a science," it is "ernpiri~al." '~~ 
The development obviously could come only by appeal to 
some extra-constitutional principle. The one the majority of the 
Court found was laissez-faire, which was, said Justice Holmes in 
dissent, "an economic theory which a large part of the country 
does not entertain."130 To Holmes, the uninformative word "lib- 
erty" in the Fourteenth Amendment "is perverted when it is held 
to prevent the natural outcome of a dominant opinion, unless it 
can be said that a rational and fair man necessarily would admit 
that the statute proposed would infringe fundamental principles 
as they have been understood by the traditions of our people and 
our law."131 
The Lochner sequence is a good illustration of the fact that 
a natural law or substantive due process spirit of judging gives 
rise to three distinct problems. The first is legitimacy. Absent 
reasonably explicit guidance in the higher law, by what right does 
a court strike down acts of legislation, thus derogating the work 
of the two political branches-for both are involved in legisla- 
tion-and thus negating the only regularized process we have for 
ascertaining the popular 
129. Hblmes, Codes and the Arrangement of the Law, 5 AM. L. REV. 1, 4 (1870). 
Achieving the needed empiricism is difficult enough in the context of a trial of a 
person. But judicial review forces the Court into a "trial" of a statute, as Mr. Justice Black 
has put it in Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 787 (1945), and the range of 
relevant "constitutional facts," and the manner of getting them before the Court, pose 
problems nonexistent in common law judging. See Alfange, The Relevance of Legislative 
Facts in Constitutional Law, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 337 (1966); Karst, Legislative Facts in 
Constitutional Litigation, 1960 SUP. CT. REV. 75; Freund, Review of Facts in Constitu- 
tional Cases, in SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME LAW 47,48 (Cahn ed. 1954); Miller & Barron, 
The Supreme Court, The Adversary System, and the Flow of Information to the Justices: 
A Preliminary Inquiry, 61 VA. L. REV. 1187 (1975). 
Justice Black amplified his point (and directly supported it by citation to substantive 
due process cases) as follows: 
This new pattern of trial procedure makes it necessary for a judge to hear 
all the evidence offered as to why a legislature passed a law and to make findings 
of fact as to the validity of those reasons. If under today's ruling a court does 
make findings, as to a danger contrary to the findings of the legislature, and the 
evidence here "lends support" to those findings, a court can then invalidate the 
law. In this respect, the Arizona County Court acted, and this Court today is 
acting, as a "super-legislature." 
325 U.S. a t  788. 
130. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905). 
131. Id. a t  76. 
132. For a review and critique of the suggestion that a distinction can be drawn 
between "improper" judicial hegemony over economic and social matters, and "proper" 
judicial hegemony over freedom of expression, see McCloskey, Economic Due Process and 
the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 34. 
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The second problem, already noted, is inconsistency. The 
third is institutional feasibility. New principles or values judi- 
cially selected for special protection are broad, and they intersect 
ambiguously with the details of industrial, social, and political 
life. Their just application depends on factual appraisal to ascer- 
tain whether the principle itself is being served or hurt by the 
statute in question in any particular case. A legislative-type 
process of factfinding and an administrative process of mixed 
rulemaking and adjudication are needed to illumine new princi- 
ples before they can be handled with assurance-modes of opera- 
tion not transferable to the judicial function without risk to the 
"neutral" judging function itself .I3' Nonetheless, the Court may 
strive, as it did in the Abortion Cases, to do research on its own, 
to open the door wide to amici curiae briefs, and to broaden 
judicial notice. But the Court is not well suited to operating like 
a constitutional convention. When it does so, the accustomed 
adversary method of proof is perverted, and the parties may see 
the case slip out of their hands on a ~ p e a 1 . l ~ ~  
133. See note 124 and accompanying text supra. 
134. What is really meant by the oft-mentioned concept of "neutral" principles is not 
so much the content of a decision, and certainly not its impact, but the style of operation. 
We contain our judges by method, and demand justification of their results by reason. 
Creativity is to be distinguished from creative leaps. As Bickel put it, "The highest 
morality almost always is the morality of process." A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 
123 (1975). The legal order is an accommodation; i t  should not march to  moral impera- 
tives. 
135. In asking for rehearing in Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), Georgia complained 
that the Court had decided the case in part on judicial notice and inputs from amici curiae 
briefs which Georgia had no opportunity to rebut. Consider the following: 
The point is that the Appellees had no opportunity a t  any stage in this case to 
present evidence which would show that the State's regulatory scheme regarding 
abortion is reasonably related to, and even demanded by hazards to, maternal 
health in the first trimester . . . . The Court has taken judicial notice of innu- 
merable facts and factors, some which are expressly referred to in the Court's 
decision and some which are unknown to the parties but which apparently were 
extricated from various sources by the Court's diligent research, which facts 
nevertheless should be subject to refutation and counter-evidence since they 
form the foundation for the Court's opinion and compromising dichotomy of 
constitutional stages of fetal growth. With no opportunity for Appellees to dem- 
onstrate the factual basis, in terms of current medical science, that its interest 
attaches a t  a particular point in the natural development of a human fetus, the 
Court has seized upon the convenient point of "viability" and crystalized consti- 
tutional command which bars state action. 
Petition for Rehearing a t  2-4, Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (quoted in Miller & 
Barron, The Supreme Court, The Adversary System and the Flow of Information to the 
Justices: A Preliminary Inquiry, 61 VA. L. REV. 1187, 1216 (1975)). 
Equally, or even more, disconcerting to counsel can be the Court's shifting of the 
constitutional issue itself after briefing. This occurred when the primary issue involved 
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B. The "Substantive Equal Protection" Syndrome 
An especially dramatic development in recent judicial review 
of legislative and executive acts has been the resurrection of the 
equal protection of the laws clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
from its original puerile status (at least in nonracial matters) as 
"the usual last resort of constitutional argument."13~ndeed, one 
may raise the question whether some recent judicial perceptions 
of the equal protection clause are so incompatible with the basic 
mode of democratic lawmaking through the legislative process as 
to make this branch of judicial review a significant threat to 
popular control of public policy choices and even of public ex- 
penditure. 13' 
This topic is discussed extensively by others,lsR so the com- 
ments here will be brief and evaluative. When the equal protec- 
tion clause is used to bar official racial discrimination, it is deal- 
ing with the clearly intended constitutional concept of equal sta- 
tus, and is not substantive due process in form or in spirit.lss Nor 
is substantive due process smuggled into the equal protection 
clause when the Court recognizes that most legislative classifica- 
tions are inexact, and uses the clause only to void those which 
transcend the bound of reason. An example of a case in which the 
Supreme Court wielded the equal protection clause in this man- 
ner is McGowan v. Maryland.'" There, in rejecting an equal pro- 
in the congressional redistricting case, Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964), was 
"switched" from the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause to art. I, § 2. See 
DIXON, supra note 11, a t  183. 
136. Buck v. Bell, 274 U S .  200, 208 (1927) (Holmes, J.) (upholding statute directing 
compulsory sterilization of hereditary imbeciles in state institutions). 
137. It is common knowledge that orders for expanded fleets of school buses as a 
consequence of remedial integration orders in public school cases have been at  least a 
slight boost to a troubled automotive industry. On occasion a direct judicial tax levy or 
forced sale of state assets has been suggested or threatened. See, e.g., Griffin v. County 
Bd. of Prince Edward County, 377 U S .  218,233 (1964) (tax levy for funds to reopen county 
schools); Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974) (money to upgrade mental 
hospitals). 
138. See, e.g. ,  Barrett, Judicial Supervision of Legislative Classifications-A More 
Modest Role for Equal Protection?, 1976 B.Y.U.L. REV. 89. 
139. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (prohibition of interracial mar- 
riage). Race is not so much a judicially created "suspect" category as it is a category 
"forbidden" by explicit direction in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Although 
the outcome may be the same, in theory there is room for balancing the competing 
interests when classifications are judicially determined to be "suspect." On the other 
hand, in "forbidden" racial classifications something like a per se rule of invalidity oper- 
ates, with the possible exception of temporary, remedial racial classifications. 
On the problem of reverse discrimination see De Funis v. Odegaard, 416 U S .  312 
(1974) and the extensive comment it engendered. 
140. 366 U S .  420 (1961). 
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tection attack on Maryland's patchwork-quilt list of exemptions 
in its Sunday-closing law, Chief Justice Warren writing for the 
Court used this language (borrowed almost verbatim from a 1911 
: 
State legislatures are presumed to have acted within their 
constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws 
result in some inequality. A statutory discrimination will not be 
set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to 
justify it.'j2 
A substantive due process spirit is contained, however, in 
the strict scrutiny doctrine developed by the Supreme Court in 
the 1960's as a special gloss on the equal protection clause. The 
doctrine applies whenever there is a legislative classification af- 
fecting enjoyment of what the Court discovers to be a fundamen- 
tal right, or whenever the Court categorizes a legislative classifi- 
cation as suspect per se.143 Put pithily, the strict scrutiny doctrine 
is this: We, the Supreme Court, feel that some rights are so fun- 
damental tha t  any legislative classification which operates to 
deny the "right" to some and not to others will not be upheld 
unless the government sustains the burden of showing that a 
compelling state interest is served by the classification imposed. 
The second component of the formula, shifting the burden of 
proof to the state, is as important as the first. 
A good example of the strict scrutiny approach is contained 
in Shapiro v.  T h ~ r n p s o n . ' ~ ~  Shapiro concerned the once common 
requirement of a l-year residence in a state as a condition of 
qualifying for welfare payments. After identifying interstate 
travel as a fundamental right, the Court subjected to strict scru- 
tiny-and rejected-the state's purported justifications of the 
residency requirement, which were couched in terms of planning 
the welfare budget, avoiding double payment, encouraging work 
by new arrivals, and discouraging immigration solely to obtain 
welfare benefits. 
There are few classifications which could be said to be based 
on truly vital interests.145 Certainly a requirement of 1 -year resi- 
141. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911). 
142. 366 U S .  a t  425-26. 
143. The view that race is a suspect classification device is supported by explicit 
constitutional language and purpose as discussed in note 139 supra. Other Court- 
recognized suspect types of classifications are not so supported; e.g. ,  alienage. 
144. 394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
145. To all such broad statements there are always exceptions, and one is that the 
law always takes care of its own. Even in the heyday of the "right-privilege" distinction, 
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dence in a state as a precondition to welfare eligibility'-16 or to 
voting status,'" or a requirement of property possession or of par- 
enthood as a precondition to voting in a school election,'4R would 
not qualify as classifications based on such vital necessity. Even 
the Bank of the United States, which Chief Justice Marshall had 
to say was "necessary and proper" in 1819 in order to constitu- 
tionalize it,'49 was not supported by such a compelling govern- 
mental need that the nation could not survive very nicely after 
the Bank was killed for political reasons in the 1 8 3 0 ' ~ . ~ ~ ~  
The states have not fared well in their attempts to sustain 
the burden of showing that a particular classification is compel- 
lingly needed.I5' In practical terms, this means that the Court's 
power to assert that an interest affected by a classification is a 
fundamental interest is tantamount to a power to place certain 
matters beyond the effective grasp of the legislature. In addition 
to interstate travel,lS the list of fundamental rights now includes 
virtually all aspects of voting and access to the ballot,'" and 
when courts were holding that a person who took a license had no right to a notice or 
hearing before revocation, the attorney's license was viewed differently. In 1873, the Su- 
preme Court reversed a summary disbarment of a lawyer, and Justice Field said that as 
a "rule of natural justice" the attorney was entitled to notice and an opportunity to 
explain and defend. Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505 (1873). 
146. Such a requirement was challenged and struck down in Shapiro v. Thompson, 
394 U S .  618 (1969). See text accompanying note 144 supra. 
147. A similar requirement was challenged and struck down in Dunn v. Blumstein, 
405 U.S. 330 (1972). 
148. Such a requirement was challenged and struck down in Kramer v. Union Free 
School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969). 
149. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U S .  (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
150. The renewal of the charter of the Second Bank of the United States was passed 
by Congress in 1832, only to be vetoed by President Jackson. The Bank breathed its last 
in 1836. 
151. Chief Justice Burger dissenting in Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972), 
stated: "Some lines must be drawn. To challenge such lines by the 'compelling state 
interest' standard is to condemn them all. So far as I am aware, no state law has ever 
satisfied this seemingly insurmountable standard, and I doubt one ever will." Id. at 363- 
64. Hut see American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U S .  767 (1974); Storer v. Brown, 415 
U S .  724 (1974); Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U S .  431 (1971). These cases involved relatively 
minor inhibitions such a s  petition requirements; most were sustained. See also Richardson 
v. Romirez, 418 U S .  24 (1974) (sustaining California's ex-felon disenfranchisement be- 
cause of $ 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment concerning "participation in rebellion or other 
crime"). 
152. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). But cf .  Sosna v. Iowa, 419 IJ.S. 
393 (1975) (1-year durational residence requirement for divorce sustained). Sosna has 
prompted the question whether "the Burger Court is preparing to reconsider the source 
of the right to travel." Comment, A Strict Scrutiny of the Right to Travel, 22 U.C.L.A.L. 
REV. 1129 (1975). 
153. See, e .g. ,  Bullock v. Carter, 405 U S .  134 (1972); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 
23 (1968). 
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limited aspects of access to judicial process including free tran- 
scripts and filing fees in criminal cases.154 
The list does not yet encompass the inequalities associated 
with unequal wealth distribution. In Sun  Antonio Independent 
School District u. Rodriguez,'" the Supreme Court left undis- 
turbed the use of the traditional system of relying heavily on local 
property taxes to finance public schools-a system that produces 
significant differences in per pupil expenditure because of differ- 
ences in levels of assessable property among the local school dis- 
tricts. The challengers in Rodriguez unsuccessfully asserted both 
that education is a fundamental right and that wealth is a suspect 
classification. 
But consider the power the Court would have been wielding 
had the four dissenters prevailed in  Rodriguez.ls6 A decision 
that  intrastate wealth differentials could not be reflected in 
school expenditures would be tantamount to saying that local 
government, as we have known it, is unconstitutional. Logically, 
the interstate disparities between, for example, South Carolina 
and California, should suffer the same fate. The impermissible 
disparities also should include the differences in costs to state 
residents of access to state colleges. Ultimately, the logical exten- 
sion of such reasoning would lead to the conclusion that federal- 
ism is unconstitutional because it collides with a fundamental 
right. Perhaps federalism is outmoded. Certainly, all students 
who study the course "Conflict of Laws" today can easily get the 
feeling that the question of what law is to be applied to an inter- 
state contract has become so confused that federalism has had its 
day. But to renounce local government or federalism by judicial 
process on the theory that education has become a fundamental 
right would make the old substantive due process nullification of 
some wage and hour laws look insignificant by comparison. The 
old battles were over our system of economics. Today's battles are 
over our system of government, and demonstrate the continued 
vibrancy of the fundamental rights-natural justice spirit of re- 
view. 
C. The  Principle of Principled Innocence 
There are some special areas which might not be commonly 
154. See, e.g., Burns v. Ohio, 360 US. 252 (1959); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 ITS. 12 
(1956). 
155. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
156. Justices Douglas, Brennan, White, and Marshall dissented in Rodriguez. 
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thought to have "new" substantive due process implications. One 
such problem area is the product of what might be called the 
"principle of principled innocence." I t  masquerades as proce- 
dural due process. I t  seems to sound in fairness and "neutral" 
principles. It seems to remain true to the American characteristic 
that although we often are uncertain of our ends, we are very 
certain about the narrow range of means permitted to any Ameri- 
can government. This is, of course, that concept guaranteed to 
win applause in almost all settings-the concept of a fair hearing. 
Almost no one opposes the right to a fair hearing in principle. 
Indeed, if the state were to lift your driver's license, you would 
wish to have a pyramid of hearings all the way to the Supreme 
Court. But if so, would you be thinking in overly personal, 
system-blocking terms, rather than in terms of the Kantian im- 
perative that one should conduct himself so as to create universal 
To bring this point to a head, one might ask whether in 
certain areas of student rights and of welfare, broadly defined, the 
Court sometimes requires hearings to be more formal than is 
feasible, rather than allowing a simple notice-response procedure 
to be used.158 The Supreme Court's recent decision in Goss v. 
Lopez,'" the student discipline case, may be a straw in the wind. 
The Court, splitting 5 to 4, held that "as a general rule"'" notice 
and a t  least an informal hearing should precede removal of a 
student from school. For the dissenters, Mr. Justice Powell said: 
No one can forsee the ultimate frontiers of the new 
"thicket" the Court now enters . . . . 
. . . . 
. . . The student who is given a failing grade, who is not 
promoted, who is excluded from certain extracurricular activi- 
ties, who is assigned to a school reserved for children of less than 
average ability, or who is placed in the "vocational" rather than 
the "college preparatory" track, is unlikely to suffer any less 
psychological injury than if he were suspended for a day for a 
relatively minor infraction. 
If, as seems apparent, the Court will now require due pro- 
cess procedures whenever such routine school decisions are chal- 
157. See text accompanying note 40 supra. 
158. See generally Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975) 
(a  review of the hearing requirement in different contexts). 
159. 419 U.S. 565 (1975). 
160. Id. at  576. 
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lenged, the impact upon public education will be serious in- 
deed. I6l 
This is an in terrorem statement to be sure, but does it have 
core validity? The majority position rests on the widely shared 
desire that restraints and sanctions be as personalized as possible 
in the cause of ultimate justice.162 Yet, a t  the same time, if a 
hearing of the required level of formality is not feasible, either 
because of the practical difficulties or because of the impact on 
ongoing relationships that would result, the effect of such a re- 
quirement-made inflexible by being constitutionalized-could 
be to force the termination of a program or policy. Indeed, unlike 
substantive due process per se, where merits can and should be 
probed and competing considerations balanced, a procedural 
"overkill" grounded on conceptualism rather than empiricism 
can operate to curb a governmental program without explicit 
consideration of the full effect of the ruling. 
D. The Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine 
A variation of the "principle of principled innocenceo-that 
is, effectively nullifying a program or policy in substantive due 
process spirit through the ploy of imposing extreme procedural 
niceties-is the recently broadened doctrine of irrebuttable pre- 
s u m p t i o n ~ . ' ~ ~  The idea is simple. Find a requirement stated with- 
out exceptions-for example, that pregnant school teachers must 
quit teaching before the beginning of the fifth month of preg- 
nancy as in Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur.lM Point out 
that not all teachers 5-months pregnant possess the characteris- 
tics which produced the "evil" the legislature was trying to avoid 
and that to impose the rule without a hearing therefore amounts 
to creating the irrebuttable presumption (factually fallacious in 
some instances) that all teachers 5-months pregnant produce the 
161. Id. a t  583-84. 
162. The paradox is that personalization maximizes discretion, and hence the oppor- 
tunity for both arbitrariness and inconsistency. There is an alternative construct of justice 
which emphasizes the importance of general rules inflexibly applied. 
163. For cases in which this doctrine is involved see Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. 1,aF- 
leur, 414 U S .  632 (1974); United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 
(1973); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973). For perceptive commentary see Note. 
Irrebuttable Presumptions: An Illusory Analysis, 27 STAN L. REV. 449 (1975); Note, The 
Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1534 (1974); 
Note, The Conclusive Presumption Doctrine: Equal Process or Due Protection?, 72 MICH. 
L. REV. 800 (1974). See also Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARV. CIV. RIGHTS-CIV. I m .  
L. REV. 269, 308, 311, 319 (1975). 
164. 414 U S .  632 (1974). 
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undesired situation-discontinuity of instruction or lowered 
physical capacity.16 Apart from the merits of any particular case, 
the irrebuttable presumption doctrine, if taken literally and 
applied rigorously, operates like the "strict scrutiny" doctrine 
under the equal protection clause to invalidate as unconstitu- 
tional much of the product of the conventional, fitful, inarticulate 
legislative process.lR6 The effect is to mandate rule by legislatures 
composed of philosopher-kings, or if they cannot be found, rule 
by federal district judges. 
There is, of course, some hyperbole in these comments, but 
the core truth may be uncomfortably large. I t  is one thing to make 
constitutional rulings in the natural justice-substantive due pro- 
cess spirit, with the competing interests considered and balanced. 
I t  is a far more serious matter to make constitutional rulings in 
formulary fashion without considering the weight of the compet- 
ing interests. Equally important is the fact that in areas where 
judicially mandated hearings are not feasible, the Court will have 
casually created an absolute bar to the legislative policy involved. 
In irrebuttable presumption cases there is something perilously 
close to what has been called in another connection-namely, the 
numbers game in reapportionment-"winning without actually 
cheating."lR7 
There are indications that the Supreme Court is beginning 
to appreciate this problem. The pregnant teachers case still 
stands and several other similar rulings have been rnade,IeR yet, 
165. Just what was the purpose of the termination rule in LaFleur was never fully 
clarified, a fact that weakened the Board's case. The original purpose may have been an 
unarticulated feeling about sensibilities rather than continuity of instruction, and the 
mere %week notice rule did not guarantee continuity of instruction. See 414 U.S. at 641- 
43 nn.9 & 11. 
166. On the subject of the legislative process, consider Judge Gesell's comment on 
the "imprecise and poorly drafted" Freedom of Information Act in Washington Research 
Project, Inc. v. Department of HEW, 366 F. Supp. 929 (D.D.C. 1973): 
Accordingly, as is usually the case where the Court must attempt to apply this 
imprecise and poorly drafted statute to a situation apparently never contem- 
plated by Congress, it becomes necessary to resolve the controversy by reliance 
on the high gloss which the learned decisions of this Circuit have been required 
to place on the legislation. 
Id. a t  935. 
167. Neal, Raker u. Carr: Politics in Search of Law, 1962 SUP.  CT. REV. 252, 287. See 
also Dixon, supra note 11, a t  167-69, 437-39. 
168. See, e.g., United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973) 
(invalidating a provision designed to bar food stamps from an entire commune if it con- 
tains a member whose father is claiming him as a tax dependent); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 
U.S. 441 ( 1973) (overturning a Connecticut statute requiring nonresident tuition of stu- 
dents whose legal address was outside the state a t  the time of application to the state 
university system). 
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the Court last June seemed prepared to abandon its course of 
casual invalidation of general eligibility standards that do not 
precisely fit all app1i~ations.l~~ At issue was a Social Security Act 
survivor's benefits provision which defined "widow" so as to ex- 
clude surviving wives who had been married to the deceased for 
less than nine months at  the time of his death. Speaking for a 
majority of six, which upheld the provision, Justice Rehnquist, 
who had been a consistent dissenter in other irrebuttable pre- 
sumption cases, recognized tha t  this prophylactic provision 
against marrying for an expectancy would let some "investor- 
widows" benefit if they could nurse the deceased through nine or 
more months of marriage, and could bar some "good-faith" wid- 
ows whose marriage to the deceased was not motivated by a 
golden egg expectancy. But he explained that most prophylactic 
provisions are inexact, so that a requirement of exactness to avoid 
any over-inclusion or under-inclusion would be "a virtual engine 
of destruction for countless legislative judgments."170 Justice 
Rehnquist phrased the test to be employed in this manner: 
The question is whether Congress, its concern having been 
reasonably aroused by the possibility of an abuse which it legiti- 
mately desired to avoid, could rationally have concluded both 
that  a particular limitation or qualification would protect 
against its occurrence, and that the expense and other difficul- 
ties of individual determinations justified the inherent impreci- 
sion of a prophylactic rule.17' 
E. The  Substantive Due Process "Sleeper" in  Section 1983 
More subtle even than the "principle of principled inno- 
cence," are what are known to lawyers as "title 42, section 1983 
actions," based on the old Reconstruction Era Civil Rights Act 
of 1871. Put crisply, about all section 1983 says is that you are a 
"dirty bird" if you violate someone's constitutional rights. This 
section provides civil sanctions if anyone acting under color of law 
subjects any person "to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, 
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws."17* 
169. See Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975). 
170. Id. a t  2472-73. 
171. Id. a t  2470. 
172. 42 U.S.C. 8 1983 (1970). The criminal code analogue to 8 1983, 18 U.S.C. Ej 242 
(1970), is similar, but contains a slight textual variation. It uses the words "secured or 
protected" rather than the single word "secured." 
For a review of limitations on 8 1983 actions of a largely "procedural" nature see 
McCormack, Federalism and Section 1983: Limitations on Judicial Enforccment o f  C'on- 
stitutional Protections (pt. I), 60 VA. L. REV. 1 (1974). 
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In section 1983 suits for injunctions against various state 
practices, the "deprivation of constitutional rights" concept 
flourishes in substantive due process spirit. It can be the basis for 
judicial findings of violations of newly perceived fundamental 
rights, followed by detailed remedial orders approaching judicial 
takeover of the affected part of the state government. 
An especially dramatic example is the recent sequence of 
litigation in Alabama establishing a right to treatment for per- 
sons committed to state mental  institution^,'^^ and upholding, in 
substance, two exceedingly detailed district court decrees on the 
future operation of three in~ti tut i0ns. l~~ The 35-point list in re- 
spect to one institution, and the 49-point list in respect to the 
others, specified in fine detail minimum standards for treatment 
procedures, records, staffing, equipment, per patient service ra- 
tios, and the like. The state had argued that compliance would 
entail the expenditure annually of a sum equal to 60% of the state 
budget excluding school financing. To ensure compliance, the 
district court had also impliedly threatened-by the device of 
reserving a ruling-the possibility of appointing "a Special Mas- 
ter for the purposes of selling or encumbering state lands" to 
finance the new standards, or enjoining "state officials from au- 
thorizing expenditures for nonessential state  function^."'^^ Simi- 
lar "vigor" can be found in judicial rulings concerning the remak- 
ing of Arkansas' prison system176 and the specification of new 
173. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. 
Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972); Wyatt 
v. Stickney, 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. '781 
(M.D. Ala. 1971). 
174. See Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (Bryce and Searcy 
State Hospitals); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (Partlow State 
School and Hospital). 
175. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1317 (5th Cir. 1974). After the court orders, 
one top administrator resigned and another was dismissed, both claiming that the reason 
was pressure for compliance with the orders of Federal District Judge Johnson. Pursuant 
to the court orders, the State of Alabama is proceeding with approximately 3,000 new 
committal hearings for patients who were previously committed under procedures held 
unconstitutional. The cost of the new hearings is estimated to be 3 million dollars. Judge 
Johnson has said that as a result of his decisions the State's mental institution patient 
population was reduced by 60 per cent. N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 1975, § 1 at 11, col. 1. 
176. Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970). The Court in Holt made this 
threat: 
Let there be no mistake in the matter: the obligation of the Respondents to 
eliminate existing unconstitutionalities does not depend upon what the legisla- 
ture may do, or upon what the Governor may do, or indeed upon what Respon- 
dents may actually be able to accomplish. If Arkansas is going to operate a 
Penitentiary System, it is going to have to be a system that is countenanced by 
the Constitution of the United States. 
Id. at 385. 
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standards and modes of administration for New York City's Juve- 
nile Detention Centers. 177 
A striking feature of these cases, and others like them,17R is 
that they are handled without explicit reference to constitutional 
clauses, or sometimes even to section 1983 itself. The whole tone 
of the opinions is that of a pronouncement ex cathedra. The con- 
stitutional violation is apparently too obvious to be discussed. 
The bulk of the opinions concern facts and prescriptions, reading 
more like legislative committee reports than judicial opinions. 
The majority justices in Lochner v. New York,17' in all their glory, 
were never arrayed like the district court judges in some of these 
latter-day section 1983 actions.180 This is not to denigrate the fact 
that there are atrocious conditions long overdue for correction. 
Some of the evidence is hair-raising.Ig1 Yet, when judges act as in 
the Alabama mental hospitals situation, they are not merely add- 
ing woof to the warp of what Alexander Bickel has called the 
"open-textured" c o n ~ t i t u t i o n ; ~ ~ ~  they are performing the high pol- 
itical function of forcing legislatures and executives to face prob- 
lems and assume responsibilities that they would prefer to ignore. 
But judges cannot become administrators and budget-makers 
without eroding not only the separation of powers, per se, but also 
their own immunity from political accountability.lR3 
F. The "Right to Privacy" 
A delineation of the so-called "right" to privacy, or even a 
full discussion of recent Supreme Court cases touching on this 
interest, lies beyond the scope of this article. In the extensive 
literature on the subject, several of the Court's recent actions in 
regard to contraception or abortion are seen as manifestations of 
a "new" substantive due process spirit, applying to new fields a 
177. Martaralla v. Kelley, 359 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). 
178. E.g., Rozecki v. Gaughn, 459 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1972); Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 
571 (8th Cir. 1968); Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182 (E.D. Ark. 1971). 
179. 198 U S .  45 (1905). 
180. Cf .  Matt. 6:28-29. 
181. Four patients a t  Partlow (one of the Alabama institutions) had died as a result 
of understaffing, lack of supervision, and brutality a t  the institution, including one grisly 
incident in which a working patient inserted a garden hose into the rectum of a fellow 
patient whom he was cleaning. Wyatt v. Adelholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1311 (5th Cir. 1974). 
182. A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 29 (1975). 
183. See generally Oster & Doane, The Power of Our Judges; Are They  Going Too 
Far?, US. News & World Report, Jan. 19,1976, a t  29-34. There are signs that the Supreme 
Court may wish to reduce somewhat the intake of broad class action challenges to state- 
local administration. See, e.g., Rizzo v. Goode, 96 S. Ct. 598 (1976), decided while this 
article was a t  press. 
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judicial power to declare new freedoms whether or not illumined 
by the constitutional document, its setting, or its easily inferred 
purposes.lS4 The following notes only a few highlights. 
As I have developed at  length elsewhere,lg5 i t  is possible to 
avoid classifying the birth control case, Grisw old v. Connecti- 
cut, lg6 a s  a unique "privacy" decision. True, Justice Douglas, 
in good form then, skipped through the Bill of Rights like a 
9 9 
cheerleader-"Give me a P . . . give me an R . . . an I . . . , 
and so on, and found P-R-I-V-A-C-Y as a derivative or pen- 
umbral right.lg7 But the Griswold case did not in fact involve 
penumbral privacy in the bedroom. No search was a t  issue. The 
defendant was a birth control clinic operator and the real issue 
was a derivative or penumbral First Amendment issue-a right 
of access to certain kinds of information needed for effective im- 
plementation of the marital freedom of family planning. The real 
"standing" issue was not whether Griswold in his own defense 
should be allowed to raise a contraceptive-use freedom of his 
clients, but whether he should be allowed to raise a First Amend- 
ment freedom of information claim of his clients.lgg 
In other words, although the privacy label is tossed about 
loosely as though i t  had some intrinsic meaning, what was a t  
issue in Griswold was not repose, or an immunity against having 
personal data about oneself disclosed, or protection against state 
invasion of the home. What was a t  issue was a particular freedom 
of action. 
Similarly, in the Abortion Decisions, Roe v. Wadelus and Doe 
v. B o l t ~ n , ' ~ ~  a freedom of action was a t  issue. What the invocation 
of "privacy" does in these freedom of action cases is simply to 
- 
184. See, e . g ; ~ l ~ ,  The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE 
L.J. 920 (1972); Epstein, Substantive Due Process by Any Other Name: The Abortion 
Cases, 1973 SUP. CT. REV. 159; Comments on the Griswold Case, 64 MICH. L. REV. 197 
(1965). 
185. Dixon, The Griswold Penumbra: Constitutional Charter for an Expanded Law 
of Privacy, 64 MICH. L. REV. 197, 214 (1965). 
186. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
187. For this graphic characterization the author is indebted to John Roche of Bran- 
deis University. See also Henken, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1421- 
22 (1974). 
188. Had the issue in Griswold not involved the "single bundle of rights" including 
the use and dissemination of the contraceptives as well as information, but instead had 
been limited to the issue of giving advice, it is likely that Justices Black and Stewart, the 
dissenters, would have joined the majority on "free-speech grounds, but with no conscious 
overlay of marital privacy." Dixon, supra note 185, a t  214. 
189. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
190. 410 U.S. 179 (1973). 
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italicize the word "personal" in the phrase "personal freedom" 
because all freedoms are personal-some are just more personal 
than others. But because "privacy" has no single, generally ac- 
cepted meaning, the mold remains pure Lochner-a judicial 
probe for the fundamentality of fundamental values not immedi- 
ately apparent in the Constitution. 
The Abortion Decisions raise a far more difficult question 
than Griswold for at least two reasons. A new factor, the fetus, 
must be considered, and the cultural overburden is far more in- 
tense because religious- philosophical viewpoints are involved. 
Indeed, one might suggest tha t  the abortion issue is more 
uniquely culture-bound than other constitutional issues. One 
would have no doubt of the outcome if the Court were the product 
of, and sitting in, either a devoutly Roman Catholic country em- 
bracing the theory of life a t  conception, or an intensely agnostic 
country with the opposite view. In the polyglot United States 
some state legislatures take one view, others another. 
In this situation, what should the public policy be, and what 
should the Court's role be? A seemingly neutral position would 
be not to impose the view of either the pro-abortion group or the 
anti-abortion group on the other, but to leave the matter subject 
to personal choice as restricted only by those sanctions which the 
First Amendment places off-limits for government-religious 
sanctions which a church, but not the state, can impose. From 
this standpoint, legislatures trample on the neutral principle of 
freedom of choice when they impose the anti-abortion view on 
those who do not share it-arguably they transgress the First 
Amendment-and, if so, the Court should intervene to restore 
governmental neutrality and freedom of choice. 
Although not by this reasoning process-or any very clear 
reasoning process-the Court in effect did so rule in Roe u. Wade 
by endorsing a freedom of choice in the pregnant woman (nomi- 
nally with her physician's concurrence) for the first six months 
of pregnancy.lgl The Court, however, did not opt for full freedom 
191. In the first trimester of pregnancy, the decision whether to abort must be left 
exclusively to the pregnant woman and her physician. During the second trimester, the 
state may regulate the abortion procedure only in a manner reasonably related to maternal 
health. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973). 
In reaching its decision with respect to the first six months of pregnancy, the Court 
placed much stress on medical data. Such data, however, would be relevant only insofar 
as the issue were the health of the mother. But virtually all pre-Roe laws allowed abortion 
to preserve the health of the mother. In Roe, the issue is the value-laden one of terminating 
a fetus before live birth, making medical data essentially irrelevant. 
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of choice. Apart from the anomalous statement about physician's 
consent, the Court subjected abortions in the last three months 
to a full legislative veto, if that be that state's wish, unless abor- 
tion be needed to save the life of the pregnant woman. 
Does the logic of the governmental neutrality-freedom of 
choice principle suggested above indicate that the Court was 
wrong not to treat all three trimesters alike, that is, to nullify all 
legislation directed not to "health" per se, but to restricting the 
freedom of choice of the pregnant woman? Or does this logic carry 
us too far? Certainly, after a live birth occurs, freedom of choice 
ends. Terminating the fetus-now-is-baby would be infanticide. 
The Court seized on the concept of "viabilityw-that is, capacity 
to  live outside the womb which theoretically begins a t  the end of 
the sixth month-as the dividing line between maternal choice 
and state power. At the point of "viability" we do not yet have 
"fetus-now-is-baby," but rather "fetus-could-now-be-baby." 
At first glance this "viability" dividing line might seem to 
offer the Court a basis for avoiding religious entanglements in its 
abortion review process and to ground its decision on an objective 
"life" concept. Under analysis, however, i t  collapses because it is 
not an objective life concept. If the two events, live birth and 
viability, were the same, then infanticide laws should apply auto- 
matically to terminating viability. Taking a somewhat different 
tack, what the Court did in Roe was to empower a state to impose 
a n  abortion restraint in the third trimester if it so elects. Even if 
imposed, says the Court, the health or life of the pregnant woman 
may still override the state's interest in preserving the fetus. After 
live birth, no such exception to infanticide exists. Equally signifi- 
cant,  viability denotes only potential life, and considerable 
support apparatus is needed to sustain life outside the womb for 
6 6 preemies." Logically, there is as much potential life after con- 
ception and during "dependent viability" as during "indepen- 
dent viability." Thus, from the catch phrase used above, the 
present tense could be dropped and i t  would be simply "fetus- 
could-become-baby" throughout the entire term of pregnancy. 
The analogy to the conventional concept of "life" or "person" 
thus fails, and the Court thereby loses a principled basis for deci- 
sion by analogy to known and accepted constitutional concepts. 
Moreover, although necessarily in quest of a fundamental consti- 
tutional value as a basis for overturning legislative choice, the 
Court rejected the forthright, First-Amendment-based neutral 
approach outlined above. Perhaps it felt that maintaining a free- 
dom of choice concept up to live birth, although possessing logical 
431 THE "NEW" SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS 87 
integrity, would have been tgo extreme in outlawing all anti- 
abortion legislation. I t  also rejected an alternative path that 
would have had equal, logical integrity. That is, the Court could 
have viewed this matter as involving such a maze of religious 
values, personal liberties, and even population control policies, 
that it should remain within the political process for the time 
being. After all, there is-or used to be-the doctrine of reason- 
able doubt to stay the Court's hand. Perhaps the Court felt that  
this latter course of sustaining all anti-abortion legislation was 
too extreme because it would have sacrificed at  least some signifi- 
cant personal interests with which the Court was prepared to deal 
now, that is, the case of the rape victim or the impoverished and 
overburdened mother of many, whose contraception has fai1ed.lg2 
For whatever reason, the Court made up its own "legislative 
compromise." Although from a personal standpoint some may be 
inclined to favor the result because of concern for the personal 
interests just mentioned,lg3 the format of the decision is disturb- 
ing. I t  fits neither the model of restricted review under reasonably 
identifiable constitutional principles, nor forthright substantive 
due process review grounded on judicially articulated fundamen- 
tal principles. The Court, admitting uncertainty, engaged in a 
dialogue transcending the issue in the actual case, and then an- 
nounced a set of rules designed not merely to decide the case 
before it but to regulate the field in such detail as to minimize 
future questions and litigation.lg4 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This discursive review of the "new" substantive due process 
has suggested that a natural justice-fundamental liberties spirit 
of review has been a persistent strand in American judicial re- 
view, despite the apparent confines imposed by our written Con- 
stitution and the absence in natural law theory of any concept of 
an official interpreter and enforcer. The manner in which the 
provisions of the Bill of Rights were "incorporated" into the Four- 
teenth Amendment gave the provisions an open-ended funda- 
192. See Wulff v. Singleton, 508 F.2d 1211 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 
2655 (1975). 
193. The author shares this inclination. 
194. We find a similar example, although on a smaller scale, in the voting residence 
case where, after nullifying a 1-year period, the Court volunteered that 30 days would be 
adequate to take care of all legitimate state concerns in election regulation. Dunn v. 
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 346-49 (1972). 
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mental liberties cast. Recent developments such as the strict 
scrutiny doctrine under the equal protection clause, the strin- 
gency in procedural requirements, and the irrebuttable presump- 
tion doctrine may operate to upset legislation even more fre- 
quently than under the old substantive due process approach of 
the Lochner v. New York era. Furthermore, these new doctrines 
have a simple, formulary character leading to semi-automatic 
invalidations, with even less opportunity for the balancing of in- 
terests than occurred, or could occur, under the "old" substantive 
due process. 
Another development, which for lack of a better term might 
be called "participatory review," is the inclination of the courts 
to lay down prescriptions for the future when deciding cases. This 
can occur as in Roe v. Wade in the course of announcing the scope 
of "fundamental doctrine." It can occur at  the level of prescribing 
"remedies" once constitutional violations are found, as in "sec- 
tion 1983 litigation" affecting the administration of state mental 
hospitals and penal institutions. 
The effect is to keep the courts in the forefront of American 
policymaking on a wide range of vital issues, and also to put 
severe strains on the conventional adversary method. Articula- 
tion of novel fundamental values and prescription of detailed 
ground rules for the future require both a breadth of intake of 
empirical data and a degree of openness of dialogue on premises 
and values to which the judicial method is not well suited. It is 
time to address ourselves to the increasing tension between the 
judiciary's role in expanded review and expanded supervision, 
and the judiciary's available methods for informing itself so that 
it can be a direct participant in the evolution of public policy. 
Perhaps that is what separation of powers is all about. 
